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1 Introduction 
Marketers are faced with a dilemma: they are ex-
pected to consolidate their existing business while 
simultaneously finding new opportunities. They are 
torn between exploitation and exploration, or be-
tween alignment and innovation. Thus, implement-
ing the right strategy is often difficult. Business de-
velopment may be eager to sell new products that 
have not yet completed the research process. R&D 
may develop new product ideas, but fail to commer-
cialize them (Souder and Chakrabarti 1978; Griffin 
and Hauser 1996). Firms are market-driven while 
market-driving firms are more conducive to innova-
tions (Kumar 1997; Jaworski, Kohli, and Sahay 
2000). And as if these tensions were not enough, 
marketing managers are also challenged to act lo-
cally but integrate globally, and to pursue differen-
tiation but obverse low-cost strategies (Ghoshal and 
Bartlett 1994; Porter 1996; Tushman and O'Reilly 
1996). 
Despite the growing interest among researchers and 
the pressing need of practitioners, there is a dearth 
of research that investigates the implementation of 
conflicting marketing strategies. The handful of ex-
isting studies to date has broadly focused on the 
marketing strategy formulation-implementation 
link (Bonoma 1984; Crespedes 1991; Walker and 
Rueckert 1987; White, Conand, and Echambadi 
2003) with only tangential reference to theoretically 
derived implementation guidelines. Consequently, 
the literature suffers from several limitations. First, 
previous research has either focused on isolated fac-
tors in support of strategy implementation or has 
highlighted rather complex frameworks (Li, Guohui, 
and Eppler 2008) with holistic studies using simple 
categorizations of various factors without theoretical 
integration (Noble and Mokwa 1999). Second, re-
search has largely overlooked the various roles of 
managers and employees in the strategy implemen-
tation process (Hart and Banbury 1994). This lack of 
an organization-wide perspective is noteworthy 
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given the importance of functional interactions for 
implementation success (Chimhanzi and Morgan 
2005). Finally, the majority of implementation stud-
ies has acknowledged that the changing content of 
strategy holds few clear implications and has conse-
quently emphasized the necessity for managers to 
continuously redefine tasks and communicate them 
throughout the organization (Shashittal and Wile-
mon 1996). Notwithstanding the quest for ongoing 
adaptability of both strategy formulation and im-
plementation processes, studies that focus on in-
trinsic tradeoffs in marketing strategies are rare. 
These limitations present the starting point for our 
research and can be best illustrated with reference 
to the more content-oriented marketing literature 
where tradeoffs abound. For instance, customer sat-
isfaction has become one of the unquestioned linch-
pins to success in marketing (e.g. Gale 1992) and it 
has been suggested to combine service activities 
with increasing sales efforts. However, doing so si-
multaneously is often problematic as customer ser-
vice staff feels uncomfortable with the twin role of 
selling products while serving the customer (Akin 
and Harker 1999; Evans, Arnold, and Grant 1999). 
While requests have been formulated to integrate 
internal structures, processes, goals and rewards to 
properly support the desired role behavior of cus-
tomer contact personnel (Schneider and Bowen 
1995), fine-grained insight on how this could be 
done is lacking. 
A related dilemma is the tension in new product de-
velopment: Incremental product improvements 
typically arise from small changes where return are 
certain, risks are low, and where products exhibit 
little deviation from customers’ current experience. 
However, innovating incrementally may blind firms 
towards technology and product category leaps 
(O’Reilly and Tushman 2004). This may lead to 
what Leonard-Barton (1992) calls the “capability-
rigidity paradox”. An excessive focus on gradual 
product improvement may imply technological ex-
haustion in the market in which firms compete for 
developing new products (Lee and Ryu 2002). 
Eventually, firms need to incorporate both incre-
mental and radical approaches to new product de-
velopment into their strategy. 
A last example relates to conflicting requirements 
for chief marketing officers who are supposed to 
have creative flair as well as financial know-how 
(Quelch 2005), which is reflected in such different 
tasks as marketing controlling, and advertising. The 
“Chief Marketing Officer’s Dilemma” (McEwen 
2008) is further reinforced by striving for customer 
engagement, which depends on both communicat-
ing and delivering the brand promise. While the 
first half of the input factors (communicating brand 
promise via advertising and marketing) is easily 
controlled, the second half depends on employee 
engagement (delivering upon brand promise via 
employees and operations). Combining both is 
likely to increase profitability (McEwen 2008). 
These examples underscore the existence of con-
flicting marketing strategies which poses a dilemma 
for marketing managers and require a balance use 
of tools, procedures, resource endowments, struc-
tures, and supportive contexts. While the marketing 
literature has provided us with a wealth of sugges-
tions as to how single elements in the implementa-
tion process can be optimized or which frameworks 
to use, the question of how tradeoffs between differ-
ent strategies can be overcome in the implementa-
tion process has been largely ignored. One exception 
is the seminal work by Kyriakopoulos and Moorman 
(2004) and its extension by Menuc and Auh (2008), 
who point to the role of market orientation in inte-
grating ‘marketing exploitation strategies’ and ‘mar-
keting exploration strategies’. The former refers to 
strategies that primarily involve improving and re-
fining current skills and procedures associated with 
existing marketing strategies, including current 
segments, positioning, distribution, and other mar-
keting mix strategies. Marketing exploration, on the 
other hand, “relates to strategies that primarily in-
volve challenging prior approaches to interfacing 
with the market, such as a new segmentation, new 
positioning, new products, or new channels” (Kyria-
kopoulos and Moorman 2004: 221). 
This research follows the exploration vs. exploita-
tion paradigm and explicitly adopts an implementa-
tion focus, which redefines marketing strategy im-
plementation as the capability to translate intrinsi-
cally conflicting demands into designs and toolsets 
that help to overcome marketing dilemmas. Draw-
ing principally on the management literature, we 
focus on how marketers rely on structural and tem-
poral solutions to solve implementation problems. 
We refer to the notion of ‘ambidexterity’ which 
originally relates to “the power of using two hands 
alike” (Oxford English Dictionary). The concept has 
first been applied to managerial contradictions by 
Duncan (1976) and has meanwhile entered various 
streams of research, like the strategic management 
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literature on alignment versus adaptability (Gibson 
and Birkinshaw 2004), the operations management 
literature on flexibility versus efficiency (Adler, 
Goldoftas, and Levine 1999) or the innovation man-
agement literature on radical versus incremental, 
innovation (Tushman and O’Reilly 1994; Danneels 
2002; O’Reilly and Tushman 2004). Strikingly, the 
marketing arena has largely ignored this promising 
stream of research. 
Against this backdrop, this paper has three objec-
tives: First, it is among the first to apply the con-
cepts of exploration, exploitation, and ambidexterity 
to the implementation of marketing strategies. Sec-
ond, it analyzes different categories for implement-
ing ambidexterity and suggests how various types 
may be best coordinated. In doing so, it provides 
novel insight as previous studies have only very 
rarely analyzed different types of ambidexterity in a 
single study. Third, it offers a multi-level and tem-
poral framework that synthesizes previous research 
on ambidexterity and prepares the ground for some 
promising research avenues in marketing. The rest 
of the paper is structured as follows: In the next sec-
tion, we provide a brief review of the literature on 
exploration and exploitation, which we will apply as 
a conceptual lens to redefine marketing dilemmas. 
Subsequently, we describe variants of ambidexterity 
which have been suggested to balance the dual 
processes of exploration and exploitation. This leads 
to our revised framework of ambidexterity, which 
we use to empirically investigate tools and proce-
dures to support the implementation of seemingly 
conflicting marketing strategies. We present the re-
search design, findings from four cases and discuss 
the results of our analysis. Finally, we identify some 
avenues for future research and managerial implica-
tions. 
2 The Role of Ambidexterity as a 
Framework for Solving Marke-
ting Dilemmas 
Most marketing dilemmas can be reframed by 
adopting the exploration versus exploitation lens 
(March 1991) that has attracted a large number of 
researchers in diverse fields of research (Birkinshaw 
and Gibson 2004; He and Wong 2004; Benner and 
Tushman 2003; Jansen, Van den Bosch, and Vol-
berda 2005; Greve 2007). ‘Exploration’ refers to ex-
perimentation with new alternatives, having returns 
that are uncertain, distant, and often negative. In 
contrast, ‘exploitation’ describes the refinement and 
extension of existing competencies, technologies, 
and paradigms, exhibiting returns that are positive, 
proximate, and predictable. Keeping with the basic 
idea of March, most subsequent studies have fo-
cused on the organization or the business unit as the 
respective level of analysis (March 1991; O’Reilly 
and Tushman 2004, 2007; Lavie and Rosenkopf 
2006). However, terms have been used somewhat 
sloppily, invoking a variety of associated concepts to 
convey the nature of exploration and exploitation. 
For instance, exploitation has been associated with 
operational efficiency, control, and reliability (Por-
ter 1996; Deming 1981; Juran and Gryna 1988). 
Similar confusion exists when exploration is differ-
entially described as involving innovation, risk tak-
ing, invention, new capability building, etc. (Benner 
and Tushman 2003). As interest grew further, ex-
ploration and exploitation became widely popular 
phrases, capturing the fundamental tension in vir-
tually any domain of organizational adaptation 
(McGrath 2001). A related discussion of organiza-
tional learning processes also questions whether 
companies should engage in different types of inno-
vation in order to maximize their outputs (He and 
Wong 2004; Jansen, Van den Bosch, and Volberda 
2005). While a variety of innovation types is clearly 
seen as important, mixing them has often been con-
sidered difficult – equally difficult as the combina-
tion of seemingly contradictory marketing strate-
gies. This has also been the customary tenet of 
strategists who argued that mixing low-cost and dif-
ferentiation strategies is likely to result in lock in or 
“stuck-in-the-middle” positions (Porter 1980: 41) 
with “firms that are not particularly excellent at any 
thing” (Miller and Friesen 1986: 42). However, from 
a strategic perspective, the strict opposition has 
been relieved as both Porter (1996) and others think 
that it is possible to “play the spread” (Day 1989). 
Further input into the dynamic interplay of conflict-
ing strategies comes from the punctuated equilib-
rium model of change (Adner and Levinthal 2002) 
which describes different interacting modes of 
change and depicts organizations as evolving 
through long periods of stability (equilibrium peri-
ods) punctuated by relatively short outbursts of 
fundamental change (revolutionary periods). Re-
searchers have suggested that firms following this 
pattern are more successful (Miller and Friesen 
1984) because they balance reactions to both inertial 
and disruptive forces. Indeed, temporal cycling be-
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tween long periods of exploitation and short bursts 
of exploitation has been identified as a viable bal-
ancing mechanism that may be both logical and 
practical (Brown and Eisenhardt 1997; Gupta, 
Smith, and Shalley 2006). 
While early studies within the exploration versus 
exploitation paradigm tell us that the two are rather 
exclusive, more recent research has emphasized the 
simultaneousness of exploitative and exploratory 
activities and their joint impact on performance (He 
and Wong 2004; Auh and Menguc 2005; Rothaer-
mel and Deeds 2004). Indeed, initial suggestions 
have been made to structurally separate exploitation 
and exploration within different business units in 
order to increase organizational performance (Dun-
can 1976). In addition, punctuated equilibrium the-
ory convinces us that both types are inseparable and 
lead to performance enhancements if pursued al-
ternately, i.e. via temporal separation (i.e. Gersick 
1991). 
Paradoxes or dilemmas have long been discussed in 
the literature (Thompson 1967; Burns and Stalker 
1961), However, it is only recently that the concept 
of the ‘ambidextrous organization’ (Lewis 2000; 
Tushman and O'Reilly 1996; Katila and Ahuja 
2000; Birkinshaw and Gibson 2004; Raisch and 
Birkinshaw 2008) provided first insights into coex-
istence and interdependencies of potentially con-
flicting objectives. While the term ambidexterity has 
been used in different contexts, it has largely dealt 
with the twin concept of exploration versus exploita-
tion in management-related studies (March 1991; 
Levinthal and March 1993; Danneels 2002; Benner 
and Tushman 2003; Jansen, Van den Bosch, and 
Volberda 2005). 
Here, we introduce the idea of ambidexterity as a 
conceptual framework for implementing inherently 
contradictory marketing strategies. In the literature, 
one of the common definitions of ambidexterity re-
lates to the “pursuit of both exploration and exploi-
tation via loosely coupled and differentiated sub-
units or individuals, each of which specializes in ei-
ther exploration or exploitation” (Gupta, Smith, and 
Shalley 2006: 693). For our purposes, this defini-
tion is somewhat imprecise as ambidexterity can be 
understood as both, simultaneous or sequential bal-
ance. Typically, the former is captured in traditional 
definitions of ambidexterity while the latter is sug-
gested by punctuated equilibrium theory (Tusman 
and Romanelli 1994; Gersick 1991; Burgelman 
2002) or temporal sequence approaches (e.g. Sig-
gelkow and Levinthal 2003). Contrary to other stud-
ies, we explicitly use the notion of ‘punctuated am-
bidexterity’ as a sequential approach to balancing 
contradictory marketing strategies. Thus, our un-
derstanding is closer to He and Wong’s (2004: 483-
484) research which defines ambidexterity in rela-
tion to technological innovation: “We extend the ex-
ploration versus exploitation construct to define 
…two generic dimensions (1) an explorative innova-
tion dimension to denote […] activities aimed at en-
tering new product-market domains, and (2) an ex-
ploitative innovation dimension to denote […] ac-
tivities aimed at improving existing market posi-
tions.” Here the authors keep their definition open 
to include both temporal and sequential coordina-
tion mechanisms. 
While different variants of ambidexterity have been 
discussed in the literature, we know relatively little 
about the systematic nature of implementing ambi-
dexterity in an organization, and our ability to in-
terpret the differences between various forms from 
a rigorous theoretical vantage point is limited. 
Therefore, we build on existing research in strategic 
management and organization theory to develop a 
novel framework based around the dimensions of 
coordination level and coordination logic by which 
different approaches to strategy implementation are 
highlighted. 
The first of these dimensions, namely the level of 
coordination, has a well-established tradition in the 
organization theory literature (Klein, Dansereau, 
and Hall 1994). Here, we refer to the levels of the 
individual and the organization and follow the quest 
by Simek (2009) to investigate multiple levels of 
ambidexterity. As for the organizational level, we 
consider ambidexterity a result of splitting the re-
sponsibilities for different types of activities between 
business units. Thus, while decision-making re-
mains within the organizational or corporate level, 
the implementation of ambidexterity occurs within 
business units with differentially allocated strategy 
variants. We further refer to the individual level, be-
cause the individual employee impacts different 
strategies (Birkinshaw and Gibson 2004) and their 
implementation success. The second dimension, 
namely the distinction between simultaneity and 
sequence, contrasts the original ambidexterity con-
cept with that of temporal separation, i.e. punctu-
ated ambidexterity where organizations balance the 
pursuit of different marketing strategies over time. 
By integrating these dimensions, it is possible to 
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identify four generic types of ambidexterity which 
facilitate the implementation of contradictory mar-
keting strategies (Figure 1). We discuss each of these 
variants in turn, and show how they relate back to 
prior research. 
Figure 1: Variants of Ambidexterity 
 
2.1 Structural Ambidexterity 
Marketing strategists have typically resolved the 
tension between exploration and exploitation by 
separating them in two different parts of the firm 
(e.g., marketing vs. sales; marketing vs. R&D; mar-
keting vs. service). The first idea of structural sepa-
ration is influenced by Duncan who argued that 
companies need to put in place ‘dual structures’ in 
order to manage conflicting demands (Duncan 
1976). For instance, R&D and business development 
are given responsibility for new product develop-
ment while the core business units focus on align-
ment and exploitation. In this vein, McDonough 
and Leifer (1983) suggested that organizations use 
several structures simultaneously because the chal-
lenges they face are so dramatically different that 
they cannot be managed within one organizational 
unit. Similarly, Christensen and Raynor (2003) 
proposed that established companies could pursue a 
disruptive innovation only in a separate business 
unit. Taking this further, Carson (2007) discusses 
the scope and required control mechanisms for out-
sourcing new product development entirely – an ex-
treme form of structural separation. 
Empirical research has further identified that struc-
tural separation usually occurs at different levels of 
the firm, e.g., between headquarters and subsidiar-
ies or global teams and centres of excellence. Alter-
natively, structural separation can be achieved by 
separating functions of a multi-product firm or by 
creating functions with a particular orientation. For 
instance, R&D is more oriented towards exploration 
while production units normally focus on exploita-
tion. Related to the overall balance of strategies, the 
most common tenet has been to structurally sepa-
rate business units: some with a focus on explor-
ative innovation and others specializing in exploita-
tive innovation (e.g. Ambos and Schlegelmilch 
2005; Floyd and Lane 2000; Volberda 1998; 
O’Reilly and Tushman 2004; Benner and Tushman 
2003). For instance, structural separation is under-
taken by most large software companies which ex-
ternalize specialist teams to develop revolutionary 
codes in distinct locations. 
With respect to implementation issues, structural 
separation is not without limits (Birkinshaw and 
Gibson 2004; Adler, Godolftas, and Levine 1999). 
Separation can lead to isolation of particular units 
as innovative ideas will not be transferred and inte-
grated across the company. Where new product de-
velopment is outsourced, idea transfer and integra-
tion issues appear to be particularly pertinent. Fur-
ther, due to the nature of its static approach of allo-
cating contradictory tasks, units may loose their in-
centives and turn inert over time. On the other 
hand, exploitation-oriented structures may lack 
creative outbursts, which may also result in inertia. 
Because of the inherent difficulties that arise from 
balancing exploration and exploitation, it has been 
suggested to adopt a longitudinal perspective where 
a unit’s focus changes over time. 
2.2 Punctuated Ambidexterity 
Organizations may also disentangle different strate-
gic marketing tasks by separating them over time. 
Major emphasis is placed on organizational units 
that focus on one type of strategy one day, and on a 
different set of innovations at another point in time 
(Brown and Eisenhardt 1997; Puranam, Singh, and 
Zollo 2006). Thus, organizations temporally sepa-
rate between exploration and exploitation. For in-
stance, the same decision unit may use a mechanis-
tic structure for making routine decisions and then 
shift to an organic structure for making non-routine 
decisions. 
In the case of product development, temporal fluc-
tuations may be best suited to cope with changes in 
technological jumps or breakthroughs which are 
likely to interpenetrate long periods of incremental 
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product development. In this situation, a whole unit 
adapts to the requirement of specific contingencies. 
Similarly, Siggelkow and Levinthal (2003) suggest 
that units switch over time by adopting more sepa-
rated organizational design at one time and more 
integrated ones at another. These designs may dif-
ferentially relate to information transfer and knowl-
edge generation and, thus, have an impact on new 
product development rates. 
Occasionally, units or teams move from sales to ser-
vice function or change from research-driven to 
commercial orientations. For instance, the RBC Fi-
nancial Group in Canada is the largest bank as 
measured by assets and market capitalization and 
one of North America’s leading diversified financial 
services. In order to become more competitive, RBC 
realized that some of their units had to become 
more market-oriented. Management started a proc-
ess whereby, over time, employees sensed that the 
culture was fundamentally changing. Their ideas 
were given due consideration, and they were being 
rewarded for market-oriented activities (Dobni 
2006). One of the advantages of these shifts is that it 
prevented corporate units from turning inert. It also 
increased inter-departmental communication which 
has been identified as vital for successful strategy 
implementation (Forman and Argenti 2005). How-
ever, there are also certain drawbacks, for instance, 
the ability to fluidly change organizational attributes 
and managerial approaches, with respect to strate-
gic success criteria and incentive systems. 
2.3 Contextual Ambidexterity 
The organizational literature also suggests that am-
bidexterity emerges when leaders in a business unit 
develop a supportive context. The resulting type of 
contextual ambidexterity, which was formally intro-
duced by Birkinshaw and Gibson (2004), is seen as 
the behavioral capacity to simultaneously demon-
strate alignment and adaptability (Lubatkin, Simek, 
Lin, and Veiga 2006; Mom 2007; Carmeli and 
Halevi 2009; Guettel and Konlechner 2009). In-
deed, contextual ambidexterity differs markedly 
from structural ambidexterity because it is “…a dual 
capacity … woven into the fabric of an organization 
on the individual level”. Instead of focusing on dual 
structures or on changing tasks for business units, 
organizations reconcile conflicting demands by 
building a set of processes, systems or contexts that 
enable and encourage individual employees to make 
their own judgement as to how to divide their time 
between conflicting demands. For instance, market-
ing managers decide whether they engage in new 
business development, service or sales activities, e.g. 
by involving customers with a need for ongoing in-
cremental product development. Here, the contex-
tual variant remains a set of stimuli that motivate 
marketing managers to act in a certain way. 
Previous research has acknowledged the role of 
managers in enabling and developing conditions for 
ambidexterity (Gibson and Birkinshaw 2004; Smith 
and Tushman 2005; Lubatkin, Simek, Lin, and 
Veiga 2006). Building predominantly on a leader-
ship approach, studies have documented the impor-
tance of contextual leadership that helps to balance 
requirements posed by contradictory activities and, 
consequently, sustains business unit performance 
(Osborn, Hunt, and Jauch 2002). Among scattered 
insights there is consensus on a few mechanisms 
that help to support contextual ambidexterity. For 
example, Tushman and O’Reilly (1997) argue that it 
is driven by internal processes that enable managers 
to handle large amounts of information and deci-
sion alternatives to deal with conflicts. Carmeli and 
Haleyi (2009) suggest that managers should make 
active use of conflicts rather than avoiding them. As 
a consequence, behavioral complexity, i.e., the ca-
pacity to adopt multiple leadership roles and change 
between them in selective contexts, is seen as pri-
mordial (Lubatkin, Simek, Lin, and Veiga 2006). 
Most of the previous guidelines seem intuitively 
simple, but little has been said about their concrete 
implementation. As Mom (2007) remarks, there is 
clearly a lack of conceptually and empirically vali-
dated understanding about exploration and explora-
tion at the managerial level of analysis. This is sur-
prising given the promising potential of related lit-
eratures on organizational learning and top man-
agement research. Furthermore, none of the exist-
ing work has yet related to marketing tasks. Switch-
ing between different contextual requirements 
seems indeed difficult as managers lack the ability 
of integrating exploitation into their mindset. 
Hence, they have to be substituted in order to pur-
sue consolidation or exploitation strategies. This is 
captured within the last cell of peripatric ambidex-
terity. 
2.4 Peripatric Ambidexterity 
While the previous types of separation are well an-
chored in the existing literature on ambidexterity, 
no explicit reference has yet been made to coordi-
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nating marketing strategies by exchanging the top 
management or founding team. For this variant, we 
initiate the notion of ‘peripatric ambidexterity’, a 
term borrowed from genetics. This specifies the 
formation of a new species through during evolution 
and is often tied to the idea of a founder who devel-
ops a new population within an isolated niche (Mayr 
1942). In the business world we can find some 
analogies which emphasize the substitution of one 
‘species’ by another. Take the example of Nissan and 
Renault, now headed by Carlos Ghoshn. The man-
ager has instilled a vision of innovative and explora-
tory leadership at the two companies that his prede-
cessors failed to achieve. However, people presently 
ask whether he might be better off in the saviour 
rather than the consolidator and incremental 
adapter role. Thus, management may again have to 
change or evolve further. Similarly, when Goodyear 
was confronted by Michelin’s introduction of the ra-
dial tire, Goodyear’s senior management team first 
focused on the existing product and avoided radical 
challenge. When they finally introduced the radial 
tire, Goodyear completely shifted from bias-ply tires 
to radicals. This strategic shift at Goodyear led to the 
creation of a new senior management team (Virany, 
Tushman, and Romanelli 1992; Smith and Tush-
man 2005). 
The literature on leadership covers this phenome-
non with reference to the ‘human trait of ambidex-
terity’ (Lubatkin, Simek, Lin, and Veiga 2006). Fur-
ther insight comes from research on founding teams 
and their prior affiliations which are presumed to 
shape new firm behaviors (Beckman 2006). Execu-
tive behavior is supposed to be driven by past in-
sights and experiences. Thus, previous career ex-
periences shape the range of action that is available 
to formulate and implement strategies, i.e., engage 
in either explorative or exploitative behavior 
(Boeker 1997; Kraatz and Moore 2002). While a va-
riety of perspectives stimulates exploration, a singu-
lar company affiliation is likely to improve existing 
routines and consolidate existing capabilities. 
The size of the firm may play another important role 
for choosing peripatric ambidexterity. While large 
firms with a variety of business units are likely to 
pursue both exploration and exploitation, an entre-
preneurial firm exists as a single business unit. 
Thus, the choice of a homogeneous team defines the 
corporate orientation to strategy variants. Contrary 
to punctuated ambidexterity, the peripatric version 
posits that it is difficult for individuals or teams to 
change behaviors. Once they surpass a critical size, 
only a few managers from the original founding 
team are normally able to manage the shift. As sug-
gested in situational leadership theories, it is much 
easier to find the manager and identify situational 
fit (Fiedler 1967). Thus, a firm needs to exchange its 
top management if it intends to implement a drastic 
change in corporate strategy. 
In summary, the description of the four variants of 
ambidexterity has shown that each of them is a suit-
able solution for not only balancing exploration and 
exploitation within an organization, but also for 
solving concrete marketing dilemmas by imple-
menting ambidextrous designs. Table 1 summarizes 
the major insights from the literature, highlights se-
lected marketing dilemmas and implementation 
categories, and presents the few existing insights on 
the practice of ambidexterity. As these insights are 
largely anecdotal, our study is largely exploratory 
(Churchill and Iacobucci 2005; Srnka and Koeszegi 
2007) and investigates implementation categories 
in more detail. 
3 Research Design 
The findings presented below are part of a larger re-
search project on ambidextrous innovation in global 
firms. In the first (and ongoing) stage of the project, 
we have conducted 50 interviews in Germany, Aus-
tria, France, The Netherlands, Switzerland, and the 
UK. Industry sectors included banking, engineering, 
automotive, information technology, consulting, fast 
moving consumer goods, and biochemistry. In the 
second stage, we purposefully re-contacted four 
firms (Patton 1990), Apple, Deutsche Bank, 
Deloitte, and Celltech (UCB), and conducted in-
depth interviews to focus more specifically on how 
diverse marketing strategies can be best imple-
mented by using ambidextrous designs. More de-
tailed information on the research design can be 
found in the appendix. 
4 Presentation of Findings 
We start the presentation of findings by reporting 
the results of our content-analysis per firm (Miles 
and Huberman 1984). The structure of each case 
presentation begins with a short overview of the 
firm and major conflicts or dilemmas. We discuss 
relevant implementation categories of ambidextrous 
designs in detail and illustrate how they support the 
combination of controversial marketing strategies. 
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Table 1: Major Approaches to Ambidexterity, Selected Marketing Dilemmas, and 
Implementation Criteria 
 Structural 
Ambidexterity 
Punctuated Ambi-
dexterity 
Contextual Ambidex-
terity 
Peripatric Ambi-
dexterity 
Major Studies Duncan (1976); O’Reilly 
and Tushman (2004); 
Tushman and O’Reilly 
(1997) 
Jansen, Van den Bosch, 
and Volberda (2009) 
 
Punctuated equilib-
rium (Gersick 1991; 
Tusman and Ro-
manelli 1994; Burgel-
man 2002) 
Temporal separation 
(Siggelkow and Levin-
thal 2003) 
Gibson and Birkinshaw 
(2004); Smith and 
Tushman (2005); 
Lubatkin, Simek, Lin, 
and Veiga (2006); Mom 
(2007); Carmeli and 
Halevi (2009) 
Genetics (Mayr, 
1942) 
Leadership research 
Burns (1978), Bass 
(1985) 
Definition of Ambidex-
terity 
”Ambidexterity refers to 
the synchronous pursuit 
of both exploration and 
exploitation via loosely 
coupled and differenti-
ated subunits or indi-
viduals, each of which 
specializes in either ex-
ploration or exploita-
tion.” (Gupta, Smith, 
and Shalley 2006: 698) 
“Temporal cycling be-
tween long periods of 
exploitation and short 
bursts of exploration”  
Gupta, Smith, and 
Shalley 2006: 693) 
“Contextual ambidexte-
rity is the behavioral ca-
pacity to simultaneously 
demonstrate alignment 
and adaptability across 
an entire business unit” 
(Gibson and Birkinshaw 
2004: 209) 
“Change towards a 
new evolutionary 
period of the firm 
which is inextricably 
linked to a CEO or 
Top Management 
Team” (inspired by 
Mayr, 1942) 
Description  Dual structures, differ-
ent units focus on dif-
ferent types of activities 
or challenges 
Single units, shifting 
focus over time, i.e. 
concentrating sequen-
tially on different types 
of marketing 
Individuals in business 
units, who decide on 
which type of activity 
they want to focus 
Top Management 
Team / CEO focuses 
on one particular 
type of strategy at a 
given time 
Contribution of Ambi-
dexterity Framework to 
Resolving Marketing 
Dilemma 
Combination of brands 
and products which 
may otherwise canni-
balize each other; tar-
geting of incompatible 
customer segments (e.g. 
Deutsche Bank vs. 
Maxblue Investment 
Platform; SAP Soft-
ware Development ) 
Disruptive technology 
changes versus incre-
mental product inno-
vation  
(e.g. Siemens VDO has, 
at a point in time, ac-
counted for 90% of all 
innovations) 
Short-term balance of  
existing and new mar-
keting trajectories 
(e.g. Google with indi-
vidual responsibility for 
radical product innova-
tion and adjustment)  
Sales-driven vs. con-
solidation driven 
marketing; emotion-
nal versus informa-
tive marketing (e.g. 
consolidation of Ger-
man Metallgesell-
schaft by Kajo Neun-
kirchen or Renault/ 
Nissan with Carlos 
Ghoshn) 
Implementation of Am-
bidextrous Designs 
Strong autonomy; 
cross-unit relationships 
(Raisch 2008); integra-
tion through teams and 
organizational mecha-
nisms (Jansen, Tempe-
laar, Van den Bosch, 
and Volberda (2009), 
Focus on specialized 
skills closely tied to the 
requirements of one 
activity or period. 
Change management 
Behavioral complexity 
(Hambrick and Mason 
1994) 
Organizational context 
(Ghoshal and Bartlett, 
1994), Culture (Ne-
manich and Vera 2009) 
No explicit studies as 
construct has not yet 
been used in the lit-
erature 
Selected Implementa-
tion Categories from the 
(Marketing) Strategy 
Literature 
 Structural variables: company’s marketing function, control systems, policy directives (Bonoma and 
Crittenden 1988); formal firm structure and networks of informal communications (Franckwick, 
Ward, Hutt, and Reingen 1994); 
 Behavioral variables: skills, resource allocation, ability to develop informal structures (Bonoma and 
Crittenden 1988);  
 Interpersonal processes: strategic consensus and autonomy, leadership and implementation styles, 
communication (Noble and Mokwa 1999), shared understanding (Woolridge and Floyd 1989); 
 Individual-level processes: cognition, organizational roles, commitment (Noble and Mokwa 1999);  
 Managerial levers: goals,  organizational structure, leadership, communications, incentives (Noble 
1999) 
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We continue with a discussion of commonalities 
across cases and compare findings with relevant in-
sights from the literature. 
4.1 Q110 - Deutsche Bank der Zukunft: 
Structural Ambidexterity 
Deutsche Bank, with headquarters in Frankfurt/-
Germany, is one of the leading financial institutions 
with some 80,000 employees in more than 72 coun-
tries. With a large presence in Europe, the Americas, 
Asia Pacific and the emerging markets, the bank of-
fers financial products and services for corporate 
and institutional clients along with private and 
business clients. In 2005, having faced hugely nega-
tive customer satisfaction and retention rates, espe-
cially with outsourcing its online subsidiary, 
Deutsche Bank24, the company decided to break 
new grounds. Driven by the Private Client and Asset 
Management division (PCAM) and its subdivision 
Private & Business Clients (PBC), which provides 
private individuals and small to medium-sized 
businesses with a full range of traditional banking 
products, the company decided to launch a new in-
novative subsidiary in the city centre of Berlin, 
Germany. The creation of “Q110 - Deutsche Bank of 
the Future”, as it is referred to, was largely market-
ing-driven and (originally) had the sole purpose of 
bringing customer satisfaction rates to new heights. 
Q110 is tangibly different from corporate headquar-
ters and other subsidiaries as it draws inspiration 
from unusual ideas and strikes out new paths – of-
ten involving innovative technology. Right from its 
inception, the subsidiary was created as a translu-
cent building, integrating shops, service offerings, a 
lounge for relaxation and some 1260 square meters 
for interaction. No counters are allowed to interfere 
with the boundary-free interior design and the open 
spirit of the unit’s team. As one interviewee (B3) put 
it: “Each time we create an encounter, we do so ex-
actly in the way the customer prefers it….this could 
be a coffee in the lounge, a product show on one of 
the oversized TV screens, a guided tour ….or, if the 
customer prefers, a quiet room. And even more, the 
customer does not necessarily come here to de-
mand a banking service, but rather because he 
likes the atmosphere or looks for inspiration and 
design products.” Thus, the centre is characterized 
by customer orientation, proximity and approach-
ability, which also includes opening hours beyond 
the expected. 
When launching structural separation, one of the 
major challenges of the new subsidiary was to intro-
duce new customer and service experiences and 
market them differently. However, this new market-
ing approach needed to be compatible with a tradi-
tionally conservative approach to banking and fi-
nancial services. Ambitiously formulated (B2), “The 
objective was to win all private customers for our 
subsidiary.” Thus, within the overall conglomerate 
of Deutsche Bank, it was clearly decided that Q110 
was to act beyond traditional structures supporting 
a context of creativity. While the structural separa-
tion of the unit was one issue, from a corporate per-
spective, it was even more important to integrate 
different marketing strategies and underlying value 
systems as both, Q110 and more exploitative sub-
sidiaries were to coexist under the umbrella of 
Deutsche Bank AG. The activities launched by 
Deutsche Bank to implement structural ambidexter-
ity can be described in terms of the nine implemen-
tation categories (see Table A.2 in the Appendix). 
Goal-setting is an important aspect of a firm’s im-
plementation process and clear objectives should be 
communicated (Noble 1999). At the stage of imple-
menting Q110, the formulation of strategic objec-
tives was in line with the exploratory function of the 
unit, e.g., its overachieving goal of customer devel-
opment and whole-hearted dedication to customer 
satisfaction. The implementation literature also em-
phasizes that without knowledge of the strategic vi-
sion, functions would not be able to implement a 
marketing strategy within a broader context (Noble 
1999). Initially, there were no immediate financial 
constraints, which would have been imposed on a 
more exploitative unit. In this sense, achieving am-
bidexterity created paradoxical situations because 
the short-term efficiency and control focus of head-
quarter-dominated subsidiaries was at odds with 
the long-term experiential focus of Q110 (see also 
Floyd and Lane 2000). 
In terms of structure, strategy implementation is 
often difficult when units are unequally affected or 
represented, e.g., when one unit is considered more 
important than the other. However, separating Q110 
as a different unit from corporate headquarters was 
not seen as a major issue (B5: “We all work for 
Deutsche Bank, we do not talk about Q110 to our 
customers.”) While structural separation was driven 
by the top management, with people working in 
clearly distinct locations, employees’ mindsets were 
not completely detached from other units. In part 
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this is due to the overall spirit and vision Deutsche 
Bank integrates in the different units. Further, an 
ongoing communication process with colleagues of 
other units reflects the typical work flow when as-
signments and clients are handed over. Formal 
meetings are complemented by informal communi-
cation, especially when the objective is serving the 
customer better (B6:”When there is a customer, 
and even if we do not have the time, we talk to our 
colleagues and we try to constantly be in touch to 
see who has some availabilities… we normally find 
a solution”). 
Incentives systems are important tools in imple-
menting strategy and include both monetary and 
non-monetary rewards (Walker, Churchill, and 
Ford 1977). Within Q110 no special financial incen-
tives were put in place (e.g. B4: “We do not receive 
any bonus payments simply because we work for 
Q110…even though the work is quite different and 
we have long working hours, including even Sat-
urdays.”) However, what was clearly mentioned 
were immaterial incentives arising both from the 
team atmosphere and, most prominently, from fu-
ture career perspectives (e.g. B3: “…many people, 
after they left Q110 have continued their manage-
ment career somewhere else within Deutsche Bank. 
Having worked for Q110 is apparently seen as a 
preparation for major career jumps”). Apart from 
being an individual incentive, the promotion of peo-
ple into other units serves a means of integration 
and transferring exploratory knowledge to exploita-
tive units. 
The organizational context, e.g. the systems and 
processes that define the context for ambidexterity 
is strongly related to individual empowerment 
through leadership. This reflects the criteria of dis-
cipline and stretch as illustrated by Ghoshal and 
Bartlett (1994), who propose that employees volun-
tarily strive to meet expectations. But more impor-
tantly, organizational stretch induces them to strive 
for more, rather than less ambitious goals. While 
employees work in a structurally separated context, 
it is these criteria that facilitate contextually ambi-
dextrous behaviors within their explorative unit. It 
seems as if this has been an objective from the be-
ginning as recruiting policies did not only focus on 
exploration-oriented people but on diversity. For 
instance, a formal banking education was not part of 
the predominant catalogue of criteria. (B3: “I was 
first a carpenter, then I had a traineeship with the 
bank, did several things in between and now I am 
here. What they require is more a certain attitude 
and willingness to learn than a formal education. 
However, this has changed a bit in the meantime 
and I think everybody now builds on an appren-
ticeship with Deutsche Bank”). The diversity in em-
ployee background and culture was seen as one re-
quirement to increase behavioral complexity. This is 
vital in a context that incorporates all sorts of service 
offerings beyond the typical banking products. 
The case of Deutsche Bank was initially selected to 
investigate structural ambidexterity, which occurs 
on several levels of the firm. For instance, it was the 
driving element to distinguish both between corpo-
rate divisions and between sub-divisions like Private 
and Business Clients (PBC) and Asset and Wealth 
Management (AWM). In several geographic re-
gions, AWM is placed in attractive locations and 
buildings clearly distant from the PBC functions. 
Spatial/geographical separation also presented the 
founding principle for Q110 in Berlin, which was 
dislocated from the corporate functions in Frank-
furt/Main. However, like a ‘nested design’, Q110 
does not only serve as an example of structural 
separation, but is also built on contextual ambidex-
terity and, to a minor degree, incorporates elements 
of punctuated ambidexterity (see further explana-
tion in the cross-case discussion). 
4.2 Deloitte Consulting: Contextual 
Ambidexterity 
In 1995, the partners of Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu 
voted to create Deloitte & Touche Consulting Group 
(later Deloitte Consulting) which, after creation, 
remained part of the overall Deloitte group. By inte-
grating skills from across the firm, Deloitte answers 
clients' demands for single-source solutions. Glob-
ally, Deloitte is present in over 130 countries and 
employs more than 90,000 people. Consulting ser-
vices are focused on three main areas: Strategy & 
Operations, Technology Advisory Services, and 
Human Capital Advisory Services. In terms of reve-
nues, the company achieved $6.3 billion in 2008. 
The need for ambidextrous designs was driven by 
several developments within the consulting indus-
try, most notably customer demand, information 
technology, changing regulation, and increased 
competition. These trends confronted managers 
with the challenge to increasingly focus on both ex-
ploration and exploitation activities. Within Deloitte 
Consulting, this challenge is most prevalent on the 
partner and manager level (D1: “The partner role is 
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naturally one of developing the business, but you 
also have to capitalize on your existing abilities and 
current projects, and this is precisely the difficulty 
– doing two things that do not quite go well to-
gether’”). Indeed, it is clearly expected that partners 
conduct both exploitative (e.g. striving for cost-
efficiency) and explorative activities (anticipating 
industry changes) to deal with current and future 
requirements of the firm. As front-line experts, they 
are so close to customers and their specialized ex-
perience makes them ambassadors of their com-
pany’s services. At the same time, they need to ex-
tend previously successful projects and procedures 
with seemingly minor modifications to fit the new 
clients. In the firm, roughly 30% of the work time is 
dedicated to new developments and research, while 
the dominant focus remains on working with the 
client. However, managers and partners have lee-
way in deciding upon their current focus. Ambidex-
trous challenges also occur in the capability-based 
marketing approach of the firm. In building trust 
with clients and potential employees, knowledge 
and competence are seen as major drivers. This im-
plies that both existing competencies need to be 
nurtured, while new knowledge is required to signal 
cutting-edge technical expertise. 
In order to implement these challenges, a variety of 
implementation instruments was used. On a strate-
gic level, the overall goals of the firm do not change 
while it continuously reorients itself towards market 
demands. Growth is certainly an issue and the firm 
tries to proportionally manage growth while expect-
ing profitability rates to rise accordingly. This im-
plies a multi-market approach (D4: “It also depends 
on the location, some are exciting in terms of firms 
coming into the country, others are more estab-
lished; you definitely do not want to be limited to 
local markets especially if you look at markets that 
are definitely going to grow […] but this requires 
flexible adaptation”). 
When this type of flexible adaptation has been suc-
cessfully achieved, “every individual in a unit can 
deliver to existing clients … but at the same time 
every individual is on the lookout for changes in the 
task environment, and acts accordingly. This is po-
tentially a more sustainable business model … be-
cause it facilitates the adaptation of an entire busi-
ness unit, not just the separate units or functions 
responsible for new business development” (Gibson 
and Birkinshaw 2004: 211). Within Deloitte, this is 
reflected in their ‘multiple market approach’, i.e., 
offering global services adjusted to local contexts. 
This requires that managers individually adjust be-
haviors to national clients while representing a 
global firm. The succinct balance arises from con-
tinuous adaptation and re-adaptation. 
In doing so, continuous learning is one of the major 
competences of the firm which does not only affect 
the managerial level but transcends the organiza-
tion. Thus, all employees are actively encouraged to 
develop, improve, and refine in-depth knowledge 
pertaining to a certain market segment, country, 
culture, product, service, or internal process which 
is anchored in the organizational context and sup-
ported by suitable structures. The organizational 
context can be described according to the four ele-
ments of discipline, stretch, support, and trust 
(Bartlett and Ghoshal 1994). Within Deloitte, disci-
pline is already reflected in the recruiting process 
where the firm is being committed to being trans-
parent about the progress toward global goals, both 
for employees and the firm. Member firms, partners 
and employees are all united in the effort to collec-
tively achieve these goals and help turn a shared vi-
sion into results. The development of the vision in-
corporates ‘stretch’ so as to inspire people with the 
abilities to organize themselves and move upwards. 
With regard to more exploratory activities, the value 
system emphasized diversity from which a broader 
variety of new inputs is believed to emerge. As a ba-
sic prerequisite, employees are recruited according 
to criteria such as openness, ability to learn and re-
lationship skills with clients. Internally, these skills 
are constantly challenged and stretched to facilitate 
optimum careers (D4: “I always try to see the po-
tential of people, I listen intensively, challenge 
them… help them, and discuss options with them”). 
In addition, the career path is open to focus more on 
technical expertise or managerial skills where peo-
ple can change the percentages and requirements of 
explorative versus exploitative behavior. These 
moves are actively supported by the management 
which lends access to resources and interchange. 
Finally, the element of trust plays a particular im-
portant role not only within the firm, but also in re-
lation to its clients. Trust is seen as the selection cri-
teria that facilitates relationship building and long-
term developments. This is also reflected in the 
firm’s approach to culture which takes on open and 
supportive stance and focuses on the idea that de-
velopment is a voluntary act (D1:”People want to 
learn. If we want to change something we need to 
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explain it to them so that they see the benefits and 
can decide themselves which way to follow”). Cul-
turally-driven knowledge development initiatives 
serve this purpose of interpersonal support and ex-
change as they are normally integrated into daily 
operations and customer needs. 
In summary, the example of contextual ambidexter-
ity shows that soft implementation factors dominate 
the balance of marketing strategies. This is in line 
with an understanding of knowledge management 
and capability development as voluntary actions 
transcending different levels of the firm. 
4.3 Celltech: Punctuated Ambidexterity 
The origin of Celltech, one of the largest biopharma-
ceutical companies in Europe, dates back to the year 
1980, when investment funds were obtained to 
build up a strong foundation around diagnostics, 
nutritional and contract business followed by thera-
peutics in the late eighties. Celltech can be viewed as 
having four basic historical periods, which link to 
the balance of exploration and exploitation. First, 
the two different strands of biologics and therapeu-
tics were meant to subsidize each other. Between 
1990 and 1992, the future was seen in the develop-
ment of innovative drugs, thus in expanding ex-
ploratory innovation of the therapeutics unit. In the 
third period between 1992 and 1996, resources were 
equally distributed to both units, while at the same 
time fostering a strategy of external collaboration. 
In this period, business units reaped off the benefits 
from exploiting their existing knowledge via cash 
milestone payments from their collaborators with-
out selling a full interest in the downstream prop-
erty rights. Finally, in 1996 the biologics division 
was sold. From now on, the unique focus of the 
therapeutics unit changed from exploitation to ex-
ploration and the success of this strategy was evi-
denced in a 25% increase in share prices in 1998. 
However, there were difficult challenges associated 
with the unit’s shift between exploitative and ex-
plorative strategies. Viewed across extended periods 
of time, balance was achieved by maintaining three 
explorative (discovery of new drugs, phase one clini-
cal trials, development of collaborative capability) 
and two exploitative activities (phase two and three 
clinical trials, management of prestige alliances, 
which facilitate access to world-class capabilities). 
The resulting question is how Celltech managed to 
induce and maintain this balance. 
Initially, management support in developing a 
shared culture and language across the firm was one 
of the major facilitators (McNamara and Baden-
Fuller 1999; Dodgson 1991). Emphasizing the need 
for exploration originated from an ongoing crisis at 
the end of the 1980s when the biology unit had been 
the major source of revenues. At that time, it was 
largely based on the exploitation of academic 
knowledge. On the therapeutics side, exploitation 
did not achieve sustainable revenues, and change 
would have to overcome the inert culture and an 
over-reliance on existing knowledge. External re-
quirements from stakeholders demanded new di-
rections and new capabilities had to be developed in 
order to focus on explorative product development 
rather than on technical excellence. One of the ma-
jor associated challenges of putting these opposing 
strategies into place resulted in ‘unlearning’ old be-
haviors. This was seen as difficult because efforts 
and risks in switching from one capability to an-
other can be substantial while necessary to substan-
tiate marketing activities. Celltech managed to do 
this by applying several managerial techniques 
which we present with reference to our category 
scheme: 
In terms of corporate goals, the changes within 
Celltech were driven by external market contingen-
cies. Celltech’s corporate strategy has been adapted 
over its 11 years of existence and the firm’s man-
agement has defined respective ‘tipping points’ 
which characterized the shifts from more explor-
ative to exploitative periods and vice versa (Dodg-
son 1991). For instance, the choice of the new thera-
peutics focus was driven by a new leadership efforts 
(Clit: ”It came from the top. Of course, there were 
managers further down but the way we were go-
ing to organize ourselves came from David Blox-
ham (Director of Research)”; McNamara and Ba-
den-Fuller 1999: 7). Essentially, the company’s 
strategy has changed from being a research com-
pany to a manufacturing company to a fully inte-
grated biopharmaceutical company developing, 
manufacturing and marketing drugs. Implementing 
these changes in the skill base, associated changes in 
strategy and learning processes needed to be dif-
fused throughout the units. 
The internal learning process was largely influenced 
by soft implementation criteria, such as culture, 
communications, and leadership styles: When the 
unit changed from a discipline and technology-
based capability to explorative therapeutics, chem-
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ists were thrust together with biologist leading to 
differences in understanding. Disciplines that had 
previously worked in isolation now had to converse 
and train each other in the basics of their discipline. 
(C1: ”It was quite amazing. Formerly, you were a 
specialist in your field... you still continued to be 
one but the new task was move out of the box and 
increase interdepartmental knowledge sharing”). 
An understanding of the language and mindset of 
each other facilitated a deeper understanding. Trig-
gers for innovative solutions were set off through 
this process of developing a shared understanding 
at the level of bench scientists. The firm’s organiza-
tional culture or ’social fabric’ played a major role in 
determining the speed of learning a new explorative 
approach to innovation (Brown and Dugoid 1991). 
Indeed, particular attention was paid to managing 
exploration for new knowledge. This involved in-
formal interaction mechanisms as staff was located 
in close proximity and the layout of the building was 
specifically designed to facilitate interactions. Sup-
ported by more formal mechanisms, like quarterly 
reviews, the team was forced to constantly interact 
with the senior management in order to formulate 
realistic forecasts and have new ideas bubbling up. 
In terms of recruitment, changes were supported by 
broadening the existing skill-base (Clit: ”The new 
people faced the informal and social club of the 
old.. it took time to integrate them but the process 
of learning to work together created a new knowl-
edge base and capability within the firm”; McNa-
mara and Baden-Fuller 1999: 11). While employees 
previously used to work in functional teams, they 
were now required to launch projects by tapping dif-
fering functional expertise within one group. Thus, 
diversity of knowledge and the combination of ex-
pertise was deliberately used as a driver of knowl-
edge development. Staff from different disciplines 
was hired to support the formation of new team 
structures and infuse the unit with new resources. 
The required roles and skills reflected the predomi-
nant mindset of the unit at specific points in time, 
while a major focus was placed on extensive training 
support to increase expert knowledge. This was tied 
to individualized incentive systems which rewarded 
enthusiasm and commitment, whereby, the com-
pany had considerable flexibility in its employment 
system to allow for this. While expert knowledge 
remained the central recruiting criterion, it was 
immediately complemented by extensive training. 
To reward expert knowledge, the role of Principal 
Scientist was created for those people wishing to 
concentrate on developing scientific expertise, 
rather than undertaking management responsibili-
ties (Dodgson 2001: 146). 
Taken collectively, the move from exploitation to 
exploration was considered risky, but the unit’s suc-
cess helped the organization to survive and grow. 
One of the major lessons learned was the fact that 
the company did not only require a change in scien-
tific, but also in managerial capabilities in order to 
succeed. These relied predominantly on knowledge-
sharing skills. Further, systems were put in place to 
ensure the long-term balance between exploration 
and exploitation by inserting discovery projects into 
the life-cycles of knowledge exploitation. This 
helped to prevent exploration being driven out by 
exploitation which has often been mentioned as one 
of the major dangers (McNamara and Baden-Fuller 
1999). In terms of the organizational context, sev-
eral monitoring procedures were implemented to 
guarantee the ongoing success of the new strategic 
orientation. In 2004, Celltech was acquired by UCB 
while Celltech’s innovation stance within the larger 
group remained the same. 
4.4 Apple Computer and Peripatric 
Ambidexterity 
In 1976, Apple was founded by Steve Jobs and Steve 
Wosniak. Within several months, they had pro-
duced 200 computers. Jobs made it Apple’s mission 
to bring easy-to-use computers to the market. In 
1978, the company launched the Apple II that 
sparked a computing revolution that drove the PC 
industry to $1 billion in annual sales in less than 
three years. Apple quickly became the industry 
leader and, in 1980, launched a successful IPO. The 
competitive position changed in 1980, when IBM 
entered the PC market and Apple’s market share 
continued to drop. In 1985, Apple removed Jobs 
from his operational role and handed over to John 
Sculley, a former Pepsi executive. Under Sculley, 
Apple worked to drive costs down and sustain prof-
itability. However, in a lacklustre period during 
1989-1997 Apple was nearly written off but it had an 
impressive and dynamic comeback after Jobs re-
joined the company in 1998. The restructuring ef-
forts continued. Between 2003 and 2008, sales 
multiplied to $24 billion and it topped Fortune´s 
500 companies in terms of total return to share-
holders in 2003-2008 with a 94% return as well as 
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during the period of 1998-2008 with a 51% return 
(Morris 2008: 68). 
One thing that makes the firm special is Steve Jobs, 
the co-founder and CEO of Apple, who has always 
been a persuasive and charismatic evangelist for the 
company. (A4: “No, by no means is Steve Jobs a 
normal boss. He is in the firm, the spirit is alive, 
and he is always present”). While Jobs has power-
fully put forward the growth of the firm, an indus-
try-wide sales slump towards the end of 1984 
caused deterioration in Jobs' working relationship 
with then CEO John Sculley. By the end of May 
1985, following an internal power struggle and an 
announcement of significant layoffs, Jobs was 
ousted before making a triumphant return in 1997. 
But why has the rise and fall of Apple been so closely 
linked to the innovation-driven leadership style of 
Steve Jobs? And why did the company temporarily 
have to get rid of him in order to consolidate 
operations? One of the major explanations builds on 
his personality. 
Jobs has always been driven by the energy to change 
the world with exciting new products. Fundamen-
tally, the design and development of the Macintosh 
in 1984, Apple’s flagship product, is an emblem of 
Job´s entrepreneurial spirit that characterized 
Apple in its garage-shop days. Driven by explorative 
innovation strategies, Jobs unleashed the creativity 
of highly individualistic and talented soft- and 
hardware designers. He infused the development 
team with a renegade spirit, often shouting the 
battle cry, “It’s better to be a pirate than join the 
Navy” (Sculley and Byrne 1987: 147). Indeed, the 
pirate metaphor was more real than fiction as Jobs, 
as well as his frenetic work schedule of 48-hours of 
straight programming and breaks with pineapple-
topped pizza generated a sense of shared respon-
sibility and togetherness. 
However, while the new product generated 
publicity, company morale was low. Apple had 
become a company that was too preoccupied with 
management and groups rather than with inspiring 
new products. Jobs’ personal success gave way to a 
professional nemesis as his leadership and inno-
vation style did not fit any longer to the company’s 
immediate requirements. Executing a shift in stra-
tegy from exploration to exploitation was seen as a 
challenge for top executives. While competitive 
demands from the external environment left no 
manœuvering space, the firm’s internal social struc-
tures, roles, and norms were still influenced by an 
explorative forward-looking management style. 
Human agency, in terms of a different personality, 
was seen as the primordial means to execute a 
change (consolidation) in the firm’s strategy. How-
ever, once Jobs left the company, Apple became so 
marginal in the computer industry and losing so 
much money that analysts debated whether it would 
implode or be sold. Jobs, who returned to Apple in 
1997 after years of exile, was still attracted to devices 
that define new categories, rather than compete in 
large, pre-existing industries. His comeback was 
seen as Apple’s desperate attempt to survive one of 
its worst phases and the company again needed a 
charismatic leader who would revive its fortunes 
(A4: “The years in which he was not there were ok, 
we still had a huge hype but he was missing. When 
he came back in 1998, we again had all the atten-
tion“). And since Jobs himself has proved unrivalled 
in the art of managing disruption, he was again able 
to take Apple to new heights. In doing so, he built on 
his ability to get his employees so motivated that 
they maniacally achieved goals or created 
technology far beyond what they thought was 
possible. 
The story of how Jobs built the Apple empire, how 
and why he was thrown out of it and the reasons 
behind his return to Apple is essentially the story of 
an entrepreneur and a firm’s peripatric ambid-
exterity – a prominent corporate marketing strategy 
tied to a single person. It shows that a leader’s 
personality influences a company and indeed a 
fundamental change can only be achieved once the 
leader is dismissed – or resurrected. (A4: “There 
will be a big bang when he is no longer there…what 
is obvious, the brand is tied to him, it is crazy how 
one person drives this firm”). 
In terms of implementing the current strategy, 
several elements were observed. Fundamentally, the 
firm is driven by the charisma and inspiration of 
one person, even though the top management has a 
proper function in the actual operations. But the 
role of a (this) CEO is one of the fundamental driv-
ers for firm strategy. Building on his charisma, em-
ployees are inspired to work for the firm rather than 
by being attracted by impressive financial bonus 
systems. The company has a very hierarchic struc-
ture (A4: “You may check back with London (the 
European headquarters) but then, quite quickly, 
you are in the US”) which also implies that deci-
sions are often checked and double-checked rather 
than spontaneously implemented by competent 
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managers. Various control systems are in place and 
often employees rather try to play it safe. In terms of 
communications, the company has an explicit non-
disclosure policy and even internally, cross-
functional communication is often limited, some-
times by design, sometimes by default. In critical 
areas, knowledge transfer is inhibited by different 
locations (structural separation) in others, simply by 
a lack of engagement into inter-departmental com-
munication (A5: You won’t believe it but there are 
many areas where access is restricted and you 
have no idea what people are doing, you have no 
idea what the company is heading at”). 
It seems like these management principles match 
certain employee characteristics. People working for 
the firm have been describes as all “being somewhat 
crazy”, A4) and the firm’s recruiting policy might 
already include a self-selection process as to which 
people apply for a job. Once in the business, people 
either conform to the vision of the firm (that of 
Steve Job) or leave. For those who have been doing 
the job for a while, it is still astonishing how much 
they feel the daily presence of the firm leader (A5: 
While it looks good, it is not the touch and feel to 
make everybody happy ... it is rather tough be-
cause you feel obliged to function, and I say ‘func-
tion’ because sometimes you just have to do what 
you are being told. But somehow, it is strange, you 
do everything for a glimpse of attention”). The du-
ality of micro-management and charismatic inspira-
tion provides some of the driving forces for the im-
plementation of explorative activities. While this 
strategy has proven successful over the past, the 
firm may require exploitative moves. However, with 
such a strong person-dominated culture and strat-
egy, the decisive question is whether the firm is able 
to change. One of the major concerns is that a new 
CEO might change the overall orientation of the 
firm and, thereby, destroy what makes it special. 
In summary, the four cases provide insights into 
how marketers could coordinate different strategies 
by implementing ambidextrous designs. All cases 
started from different contexts and highlighted dif-
ferent implementation criteria. While each firm 
applied specific implementation tools and proce-
dures, there are several commonalities across cases, 
which we discuss with reference to the relevant 
literature. 
 
5 Discussion 
For every firm it is essential to achieve both growth 
and profitability which often hinges upon the suc-
cessful implementation of marketing strategies. This 
includes the combination of exploratory and ex-
ploitative activities. A focus on one of these tasks 
may be easy but combining and balancing them 
poses a major challenge. Addressing the question of 
how this dilemma could be solved, this study con-
tributes to the emerging literature of ambidextrous 
designs and investigates them through the lens of a 
marketing perspective. The discussion of four dif-
ferent types of ambidexterity has illustrated an in-
creasing number of studies that deals with struc-
tural, contextual, and punctuated ambidexterity. In 
addition, we have introduced a fourth type of peri-
patric ambidexterity that has so far not been dealt 
with in the literature. While there has recently been 
an increasing interest into the issue of ambidexter-
ity, insights into how ambidextrous designs can be 
implemented in order to solve marketing dilemmas 
are largely lacking. In addition to specific findings 
from each of our case firms, several commonalities 
have emerged that extend the previous literature on 
ambidexterity. 
In the case of structural ambidexterity, the decision 
to coordinate different activities across organiza-
tional units has been identified as an important step 
(O’Reilly and Tushman 2005). For Deutsche Bank 
this was an essential move forward to develop a new 
business approach outside the confines of corporate 
hierarchies. This solution has also been suggested 
when executives apply paradoxical cognitions 
(Smith and Tushman 2005) to frame exploration vs. 
exploration tensions, e.g. traditional values vs. ex-
citement in banking, and consequently actions in 
the firm. However, separating units is only one side 
of the coin and successfully managing an explorative 
or exploitative unit does not provide insight into 
how value generated in this unit can be transferred 
back to other units or even corporate headquarters. 
While one of the advantages of structural ambidex-
terity is that it creates “pragmatic boundaries” (Car-
lile 2004) which safeguards conflicting activities, 
our findings suggest that employees working in 
separate units realize the potential paradox of ex-
ploration and exploitation but do not necessarily see 
them as constraints. For instance, Q110 employees 
capitalize on their specific status, but integrate and 
reintegrate values and experiences of the different 
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units by regular exchanges and potential career 
moves. Thus, while structural ambidexterity was 
used to kick-start exploratory innovation in bank-
ing, contextually ambidextrous individuals were 
seen as a necessary condition to maintain the spe-
cific status of the subsidiary. 
Against conventional insight which focuses on the 
top management as integrators (O’Reilly and Tush-
man 2004; Smith and Tushman 2005; Lubatkin, 
Simek, Lin, and Veiga 2006), Deutsche Bank ap-
plies a ‘nested design’. On the (inter)personal level, 
it relies on informal knowledge flows and the re-
cruitment of contextually ambidextrous people. 
While selected mechanisms like senior team inte-
gration or cross-functional interfaces have been dis-
cussed, the more informal integration mechanisms 
should not be underestimated (Jansen, Tempelaar, 
Van den Bosch, and Volberda 2009). In addition to 
formal and often pre-established integration 
mechanisms, informal procedures refer to emergent 
social properties that influence the way employees 
exchange knowledge across boundaries (Tsai 2002). 
In the case of Deutsche Bank, both formal and in-
formal communication channels complement each 
other, information barriers between units are low, 
and knowledge exchange is driven by individuals. 
In comparing structural and contextual ambidexter-
ity, the former allocates conflicting tasks to different 
units, but misses the value creating component if 
subsequent integration is not sufficiently ensured. 
Hence, the interplay between structural and contex-
tual ambidexterity provided a basic means to sup-
port knowledge transfer from exploratory to ex-
ploitative units. People with the ability to behave 
differently in the same context (i.e. contextually 
ambidextrous managers) or those who are able to 
switch contexts (which may drive the shift of whole 
teams towards explorative or exploitative functions, 
i.e. punctuated ambidexterity) can be seen as vital 
agents of balancing conflicting marketing strategies. 
For these capabilities and their efficient allocation 
across the boundaries of structurally separated 
units, the organization needs to provide career in-
centives to support contextually sensitive managers. 
This leads to continuously creating new combina-
tions of exploratory and exploitative marketing 
strategies at other levels of the firm (Sirmon, Hitt, 
and Ireland 2007). This is what both Deutsche Bank 
and also Celltech did. In promoting former Q110 
employees into higher management positions they 
transferred a creative customer and marketing focus 
into more exploitation-oriented units. In the case of 
Celltech, diluting exploitative constraints and pro-
gressing to exploration was also based on career op-
tions and diversified recruiting. 
In the case of Apple, more formal communication 
structures dominate. What is communicated largely 
ties to the vision which drives the overall marketing 
approach, and has spill-over effects to structures 
and leadership principles. Most implementation pa-
rameters are tied to the dominant orientation and 
implementation success becomes a matter of both 
communication quality and quantity. For instance, 
Apple deliberately minimizes communication flows 
between hardware and software developers (struc-
tural separation) and strategic communication 
channels are dominated from the top. This is 
equally manifested in the external non-disclose pol-
icy as well as limited interdepartmental communi-
cation. While it is important that visions are com-
municated to rationalize both exploratory and ex-
ploitative innovation (Jansen, Van den Bosch, and 
Volberda 2006), in the peripatric version of ambi-
dexterity, one type of strategy at a specific time is 
emphasized. In order to implement explorative 
marketing strategies the dominant vision is also re-
flected in recruiting practices. These focus on intrin-
sically motivated people who share the approach 
and are ‘fanatics’ by themselves. While other ambi-
dextrous designs may fail in this constellation, here 
the dominance of a top innovator and explorer pro-
vides the glue that welds everything together. 
This is in stark contrast to contextual ambidexterity 
(Deloitte Consulting), which integrates an openness 
of mind into value systems and promotes flexibility 
in deriving at customer-centric work with high satis-
faction rates. While value systems are inspiring, the 
continuity of the business requires that strategy is 
flexibly adapted (even though this is unlikely to oc-
cur in the form of dramatic jumps). In turn, it re-
quires managerial mindsets that are equally open to 
conflicting options of exploration and exploitation, 
especially when acting in an international context. 
Recent insights in this typical international market-
ing dilemma have been discussed with reference to 
the notion of strategic ambidexterity. This captures 
the trade-off between a multiple pro-growth vs. a 
focused pro-profit strategy (Han 2007) where the 
former favours multinational marketing and the lat-
ter standardized market operations. 
In comparing contextual and punctuated ambidex-
terity from a knowledge development and recruiting 
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perspective, several insights emerge. Both can be 
explained with reference to the dynamic capability 
view (Teece, Pisano, and Shuen 1997) which has re-
cently been extended to include marketing dynamic 
capabilities (MDCs), i.e. “the responsiveness and 
efficiency of cross-functional business processes for 
creating and delivering customer value in response 
to market changes” (Fang and Zou 2009: 3). MDCs 
are required because the ability to create and deliver 
superior customer value through efficient and fast-
responding marketing processes has become one of 
the major sources of competitive advantage to firms 
(Day 1994). It is the customer focus which makes 
MDCs particularly relevant for this research as it 
distinguishes MDCs from other dynamic capabili-
ties. In the case of Deloitte, MDCs are specifically 
related to customer relationship building via trust 
and capability development which focuses on multi-
context and multi-client adaptability. This is in line 
with what Bartlett and Ghoshal’s (1989) focus on 
integrating recruitment and selection, training and 
career path management as ways of stimulating a 
company to become globally integrated and locally 
responsive at the same time. In contrast, Celltech’s 
capability development is rather product-based 
(drug development) and process-based (learning to 
collaborate) where expert competences need to be 
translated into core technologies and cutting edge 
offerings. 
The differences between variations of ambidexterity 
is also reflected in the recruiting approaches, which 
focus either on generalist and client-compatible atti-
tudes (contextual ambidexterity) or in-depth spe-
cialist knowledge (punctuated ambidexterity) or on 
both to be allocated to different units (structural 
ambidexterity). A specialist focus is required when 
firms transgress through certain stages, and special-
ist knowledge provides psychological safety (Ne-
manich and Vera 2009). However, both the Celltech 
case and the literature suggest that strategy imple-
mentation is improved through flexibly inserting 
new and disconnected knowledge into the firm 
which challenge the existing resource base (Guettel 
and Konlechner 2009). This is especially important 
when firms experience core technology changes 
which require the speedy acquisition of new knowl-
edge without rendering previous expert knowledge 
superfluous. Here, complementing specialists’ 
knowledge by ongoing learning routines which ad-
just the corporate knowledge base has proved use-
ful. In comparison, peripatric ambidexterity is likely 
to rely on specialist knowledge to promote and im-
plement one type of strategy without engaging em-
ployees into too many cognitive paradoxes (Smith 
and Tushman 2005). This is not to say that learning 
does not play a role in a peripatric orientation, but 
companies need the brightest technological people 
and often leave soft-skills development to individual 
initiatives. 
In summary, both within and across-case discus-
sions have highlighted different implementation in-
struments which can be applied to solve marketing 
dilemmas. These insights may be used for formulat-
ing further challenges for research. 
6 Implications for Further Re-
search and Marketing Practice 
Implications for further research can be derived 
from both the limitations and the contributions of 
this study. The limitations of this research can be 
divided into three categories. First, in exploratory 
research small numbers of cases are acceptable, but 
investigating additional and more varied cases is 
likely to yield promising insights. Second, with the 
choice of Apple and Celltech, we presented two ex-
amples focused on (the move towards) explorative 
strategy while insights into the opposite direction 
would also be useful. Third, in investigating imple-
mentation categories, we relied on a mix of existing 
categories from the marketing strategy and ambi-
dexterity literature. However, both streams of re-
search have not yet reached a stage of consolidated 
insights which is evidenced by the heterogeneity of 
approaches and elements (Li, Guohui, and Eppler 
2008). One of the immediate consequences in this 
research relates to initially low inter-rater reliability 
percentages due to overlapping categories. Thus, 
further research may start from redefining catego-
ries based on empirical insights. 
Our results demonstrate that knowledge of ambi-
dextrous designs, associated tools and procedures is 
a prominent requirement when companies want to 
solve their marketing dilemmas. Each of the four 
ambidextrous designs facilitates the solution of dif-
ferent marketing dilemmas and requires a different, 
partly overlapping, set of implementation factors. 
These relate both to the personal and the organiza-
tional level and warrant further attention (Table 2). 
Further, studies should not only investigate the im-
plementation of one of the four types of ambidexter-
ity in isolation but focus on their dynamic interplay 
both within organizations and over time. 
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Table 2: Summary and Research Implications 
 Marketing Driver of Ambi-
dexterity 
Implementation 
Personal Level  
Implementation 
Organizational Level 
Structural ambidexterity  New business approach out-
side stagnating core busi-
ness 
 Conflicting values of mar-
keting message (e.g. excite-
ment vs. tradition) 
 Integration through infor-
mal knowledge flows 
 Recruiting of contextually 
ambidextrous people 
 Transversal careers across 
units 
 Top management provides 
vision and goals but grants 
autonomy in procedures 
Peripatric ambidexterity  Personality-driven product 
and marketing approach 
 Desired spill-over effects 
(person – organization - 
brand) 
 Recruiting focus explora-
tion-oriented people 
 Intrinsic motivation drivers 
 Clear guidelines on work 
procedures 
 Limited cross-functional 
interfaces (in critical areas) 
Contextual ambidexterity  Market approach  
 Marketing dynamic capa-
bilities 
 High motivated to learn and 
quickly adjust to new con-
tingencies 
 Trust as essential personal 
and interpersonal compe-
tence 
 Career development with 
leeway for technical and 
managerial careers 
 Managerial support 
throughout business proc-
esses, task assignments, ca-
reer perspective 
Punctuated 
ambidexterity 
 Core technology changes 
(product substitutions)  
 Core competence-based 
marketing 
 Expert knowledge 
 Willingness to engage in 
learning and knowledge 
sharing  in addition to ex-
pert status 
 Effective linkages between 
teams through shared cul-
ture 
 Multi-functional project or-
ganization 
 
In addition, attention should also be paid to situa-
tions when firms adopt temporal models of ambi-
dexterity as they are required to optimize the fit be-
tween internal design parameters and constantly 
changing external contingencies. Research may be 
further inspired by configuration theories (Miller 
and Friesen 1984) which discuss the interplay be-
tween these two types of parameters. It would also 
be particularly important to analyze whether the use 
of different types of ambidexterity is conducive to 
explaining underlying differences in terms of per-
formance. 
For marketing practitioners, an understanding of 
the four types of ambidexterity and the associated 
implementation tools provides a basis for finding 
systematic solutions to several common marketing 
dilemmas. This could imply the tension between 
marketing established or conventional products and 
emerging new products which may be resolved by 
structural ambidexterity. Conflicts between a zeal-
ous business development and a sluggish R&D may 
point towards the need for a better synchronisation 
through punctuated ambidexterity. In contrast, if 
senior management finds its company too research 
driven but lacking in commercialisation, a new mar-
keting director may offer a solution, i.e., peripatric 
ambidexterity might be called for. Finally, senior 
marketing managers will have to give their brand 
managers sufficient latitude to strike the fine bal-
ance between the introduction of new products and 
the extension of existing products. Thus, creating 
the right environment for contextual ambidexterity 
would be the order of the day. 
However, as this study has illustrated, rather than 
focusing on isolated marketing dilemmas, managers 
will most likely require a more integrated approach. 
Thus, meeting the multi-layered challenges of suc-
cessful marketing, they are likely to implement dif-
ferent types of ambidexterity in the firm. Fulfilling 
singular requirements may be relatively easy and 
previous research has extensively dealt with the du-
alism of exploration and exploitation strategies, but 
as Raisch (2008: 484) urges us “further insights are 
needed about the specific contexts [of ambidextrous 
designs], which factors contribute to their successful 
implementation, and what outcomes are likely to 
result from their use.” This implies that understand-
ing the compatibility of implementation instru-
ments becomes a vital part in pursuing balanced 
marketing strategies. 
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7 Conclusions 
This study is among the first that adopts a market-
ing lens to investigating ambidexterity. We contrib-
ute to both previous research and managerial prac-
tice as to how firms in general - and marketing 
management in particular - may manage and organ-
ize the dual pursuit of exploratory and exploitative 
strategies. Even though a few existing studies have 
investigated selected types of ambidexterity, we are 
currently unaware of any research that includes the 
notion of peripatric ambidexterity and further dis-
cusses the interplay of four different balancing 
mechanisms. Our findings illustrate that firms use 
these mechanisms by drawing on a variety of im-
plementation elements. In changing or extending 
their marketing orientation, managers need to be 
well aware of the complementary and potentially 
conflicting use of implementation designs. 
Appendix - Details of Methodological 
Approach 
Each of the four firms, Celltech, Apple, Deloitte, and 
Deutsche Bank, was approached to provide addi-
tional data on the specific ambidexterity type it 
scored most prominently in the first round, i.e., 
Deutsche Bank for structural ambidexterity, 
Deloitte for contextual ambidexterity, Apple for pe-
ripatric ambidexterity, and Celltech for punctuated 
ambidexterity. However, during interviews, new 
evidence for different types of ambidexterity was 
found, which gave rise to further analysis. 
When (re)contacting these firms and respective in-
terview partners, we encountered a differential will-
ingness to answer further detailed questions. While 
interviews with Deutsche Bank and Deloitte were 
continued with semi-structured questionnaires, 
both Celltech and Apple required a change in the 
interview approach. Celltech is a company, which 
was acquired by UCB in 2004 and no longer exists 
in its original form. In the first round, interviews in-
volved broader aspects of innovation and strategy; 
but the focus of this second round-investigation re-
lates to very specific developments in the past, and 
suitable interview partners that experienced Cell-
tech’s strategy changes were difficult to find. How-
ever, we decided to maintain the firm as it is one of 
the typical classic cases of punctuated ambidexterity 
(equilibrium), which is well documented in the case 
literature (e.g. McNamara and Baden-Fuller 1999; 
McNamara, Baden-Fuller, and  Howell 1999). Con-
sequently, our analysis of Celltech is literature-
based and complemented by a few selected inter-
view insights. In the case of Apple we encountered 
further challenges, which we did not fully realize in 
the first round. Due to a corporate non-disclosure 
policy it was difficult to obtain more fine-tuned in-
formation. We, therefore, included external partners 
and former employees. In addition, we used projec-
tive techniques in the interview process. Projective 
or third person techniques are used when the re-
quired information cannot be accurately obtained 
by direct methods (or directly concerned interview 
partners). They are also highly recommended in ex-
ploratory research to provide significant insights 
(Webb 1992). As qualitative analysis and interpreta-
tion of projective techniques are no different from 
the procedures for qualitative research in general, 
we continue the analysis phase in the same way as 
for direct interviewing. 
In sum, in the second round we conducted 20 inter-
views, by applying three complementary methods: 
traditional interviews based on semi-structured 
questionnaires, literature-based case analysis, and 
interviews based on projective techniques. All inter-
views lasted, on average 90 minutes. When contact-
ing interview partners, all participants were in-
formed that the study was primarily about balanc-
ing difficult marketing-related tasks and conflicts, 
and how to communicate and market these chal-
lenges both internally and externally. The term 
“ambidexterity” was not mentioned initially as pre-
vious experience indicates that the majority of man-
agers has not yet encountered the notion of ambi-
dexterity even though most managers use what the 
literature has identified as ‘ambidextrous coordina-
tion designs’. This discrepancy is a pertinent issue as 
managers often use different words than research-
ers and a shared meaning is required before advanc-
ing with the issue (Astley and Zammuto 1992). 
In addition to interview data, available material 
both from the public press, company reports and 
existing previous research was included for data tri-
angulation (Jick 1979). Resulting insights illustrate 
our theoretical perspective and describe the chal-
lenges associated with implementing each type of 
ambidexterity. In order to prepare data for analysis, 
interviews were audio-taped, transcribed and, when 
necessary, translated into English. Full transcripts 
of interviews were prepared and, subsequently, 
abridged to capture the data directly relevant to our 
research topic. We assigned code numbers to each 
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interview per firm (A1, A2, etc. for Apple, B1, B2 etc. 
for Deutsche Bank, C1, C2, etc. for Celltech, and D1, 
D2, etc. for Deloitte), which later facilitated the 
identification of interview quotes and multiple men-
tions. In the categorization process, nine major 
categories emerged. Assigning categories was based 
on a deductive-inductive procedure which combines 
the advantages of reliability (with criteria derived 
from theory) and those of validity (which suggest an 
inductive development that captures the essence of 
the phenomenon) (Druckman and Hopmann 
2002). We started with categories from the imple-
mentation literature and complemented them with 
those mentioned for ambidextrous strategies. We 
decided to define main categories (9) and main-
tained sub-categories (24) whenever this seemed 
useful to support subsequent coding (Srnka and 
Koeszegi 2007). In the coding process, we assigned 
interview statements to categories. Statements or 
“sense units” (Bubert, Gadner, and Richards 2004) 
have been identified as the best basis for coding and 
analysis. We independently categorized the 127 
statements, which we identified in the interviews, 
into the nine categories illustrated in the strategy 
and ambidexterity implementation literature (see 
Table A.1 for an example of the coding process). 
Table A.1: Coding Example 
Definition – Main Category Coding: Firm/Interview No.-Category-Subcategory: Sense unit 
with key words in italics 
Goals: current and future objectives (financial and strategic) of 
the firm, both corporate and business unit level; vision of the 
firm, vision of CEO, firm development 
A3-G(oals)-St(rategic Vision): Sense unit: “[…] and when you are 
asked to judge on the future; what you can always say is that there 
will be something new, there is constant innovation,… the firm is 
constantly re-inventing itself and this is how it defines its strategy.” 
Organizational Context: formal guidelines, controls, monitor-
ing, daily work context that affects motivation, organization of 
work environment 
B3-O(rganizational)Context-Au(tonomy): Sense unit: “You know, 
there are constraining and supporting factors but we work here be-
cause we like the context; we organize our work largely by ourselves, 
.. Sense unit: we kind of create our own environment so that eve-
rybody can work according to the best of his abilities and for the 
maximum benefit of Q110…” 
 
As one of the criteria for “good” science is based 
inter-subjectivity through multiple person in-
volvement, we independently engaged two people 
in the process of allocating statements to the nine 
major categories identified in the literature. The 
researchers initially achieved an agreement of 
65% which is not very high. Major differences oc-
curred in the categories leadership style vs. com-
munications and behavior complexity vs. recrui- 
 
ting. Referring back to the strategy implementa-
tion literature did, indeed, provide evidence that 
these categories have often been diluted (Li, Guo-
hui, and Eppler 2008). After in-depth discussion, 
we increased agreement and were able to allocate 
all statements to nine categories. The resulting 
categories and subcategories are summarized in 
Table A.2 which also depicts the number of men-
tions per category and some illustrative quotes. 
 
Table A.2: Implementation Categories, Subcategories, and Interview Examples 
Implementation 
Categories (num-
ber of mentions) 
Litera-
ture Re-
ferences  
Subcategories Illustrations 
Goals 
 
(11x) 
Noble 
(1999) 
 Corporate 
goals 
 Unit goals 
 Strategic 
vision 
A4: ”There is always the run after the next hype, you feel the drive and you 
know what, when Steve was away, it was different“ 
B2: “The concept [Q110] was established with a long-term perspective in 
mind, but of course it is subject to change. This is pretty clear when we want 
to fill the notion ‘bank of the future’ with life…what is important is new client 
generation and we have roughly 50% higher rates than other subsidiaries; 
our client focus in clearly king“ 
Clit: ”It came from the top. Of course, there were managers further down 
but the way we were going to organize ourselves came from David Bloxham 
(Director of Research)”; (McNamara et al. 1999: 7) 
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Table A.2 continued: Implementation Categories, Subcategories, and Interview Examples 
Implementation 
Categories (num-
ber of mentions) 
Litera-
ture Re-
ferences  
Subcategories Illustrations 
   D2: “We always have very clear and challenging objective and we keep them 
high… but , actually our strategy is not changing dramatically but the envi-
ronment is and we need to update our knowledge” 
Structures 
 
(12x) 
Govinda-
rajan 
(1988) 
Drazin and 
Howard 
(1984) 
 Organization 
structures 
 Team struc-
ture 
 Integration 
A1: “We have several clearly defined structural devices, e.g. international 
sales and all the financial functions are coordinated in Cork… but even here, 
there are regional structures, even though with few hierarchies… and very 
quickly you are in the US” 
B8: “We have two teams which deal with customers in a different way. First, 
there is the Forum Team, which is the first contact for everybody. These 
people are moving freely in the area. Then, we have the Client Team, which 
is responsible for fixed meetings, and for coordination subsequent meet-
ings.” 
C2: “It was very fluid…you were in contact with almost everybody…in the 
old times, you went to work and you had your three colleagues, that was it..” 
D1: “Of course we have clear structures, but it depends on the level, and it is 
more that you facilitate exchange than imposing constraints.” 
Leadership Style 
 
(14x) 
Gupta and 
Govinda-
rajan 
(1984) 
 Support 
 Motivation 
 Empathy 
A4: “He clearly is the great motivator…when you listen to his public 
speeches, and even more, when you meet him internally, the vision is alive, it 
lives, and he is by no means a normal boss” 
A4: “It is crazy how one person drives this firm…you are always expecting 
him to introduce the next hype and you discuss it in your team with your 
colleagues and you also think about new ideas” 
B7: “You know, we all work here because we wanted to; if we work long 
hours, this does not really matter because we are motivated, we believe we 
are doing an exciting job here, and what’s most important…we like it” 
Clit: “New management entered the firm but was cautious at first, galvaniz-
ing the commitment of a key group of scientists and administrators prior to 
announce a change in strategy” (McNamara and Baden-Fuller, 1999: 304) 
D4: “I always try to see the potential of people, I listen intensively, challenge 
them… help them, and discuss options with them” 
Communications 
 
(21x) 
Westley 
(1990) 
Rapert, 
Velliquet-
te, and 
Garretson 
(2002) 
 Informal 
communica-
tion  
 Formal 
communica-
tion 
A2: “You get to know what is important for your work but sometimes I 
would like to be more involved. Also, you hear different things from different 
people as if they do not communicate with each other” 
B8: „It is important that you do not only focus on your own things but also 
show responsibility towards each other and act to support the customer best. 
This requires that you, kind of anticipate what others will do but also that 
you constantly communicate“ 
C1:”There were so many diverse opinions, people looked at the world differ-
ently…we were constantly in the process of negotiation, you know this was 
everywhere, we did not rely on any official communications channels…but of 
course, there was also information coming from the boss” 
D4: ”Much is based on trust. I try to communicate clearly and build a rela-
tionship. It is like with external clients. Once they work with you they know 
they can trust us and we help them. It is sometimes that these relationships 
are more important than the knowledge because others also have this 
knowledge”  
Incentives  
 
(9x) 
Walker, 
Churchill, 
and Ford 
(1977) 
 Financial 
 Immaterial 
A1: “Formal financial incentives are very rare…this was different earlier, but 
today, you have to launch a big bang. But you work in this company and 
quite often you feel this is an incentive…”  
B3: ”There is no differences in financial rewards, this is pretty much the 
same across all subsidiaries.. B3: “…many people, after they left Q110 have 
continued their management career somewhere else within Deutsche Bank. 
Having worked for Q110 is apparently seen as a preparation for major career 
jumps” 
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Table A.2 continued: Implementation Categories, Subcategories, and Interview Examples 
Implementation 
Categories (num-
ber of mentions) 
Litera-
ture Re-
ferences  
Subcategories Illustrations 
   C2: ”We had very formal appraisal systems and there was an additional in-
centive system with quarterly bonus awards for exceptional contributions.” 
D2: “You can imagine that incentives are attractive and we expect a lot. In 
the long run, it will be your overall performance that brings you to partner 
level and, apart from everything else, this is well rewarded” 
Culture 
 
(16x) 
Nemanich 
and Vera 
(2009) 
 Team spirit 
 Openness 
A5: “You find many people here late in the night who discuss and experi-
ment with colleagues…it is there that you develop the best ideas”  
B1: ”We have a strong team spirit and we help each other even if this is 
sometimes difficult … especially if you look at the large area here. But it is 
clear that we try to permanently be in touch, this also relates to communica-
tions between teams and between bankers and shop employees and – you 
know, even though the latter are not bankers, they are employed by DB, we 
have no typical shop in the shop principle here” 
Clit: “We created a culture of flexibility. For instance, one principle is the 
sanctioning of scientists spending up to 10 percent of their time on individ-
ual projects…We want them the use their knowledge in a direction uncon-
strained by project requirements” (McNamara, Baden-Fuller, and Howell 
1999: 12) 
D3: “We have a very open culture, where we are critical and challenge each 
other. We are interested in what people and their potential to contribute, 
and this is what we permanently encourage” 
Organizational  
Context 
 
(11x) 
Bartlett 
and Gho-
shal 
(1994); 
Jaworski 
and McIn-
nis (1989) 
 Autonomy  
 Guidelines / 
Control 
 Managerial 
Support 
A1: “It’s simply that you can do what you like most. People hang around late 
hours and discuss the newest gadgets, others go early or work from home… 
you can really influence your own work environment” 
A1: “There are very clear and strict guidelines and you normally check with 
your boss and make sure he agrees” 
B2: “Of course, there were guidelines but they used to be much stronger ... 
Today, there are many things we can largely decide on our own and quite 
often only briefly check back with the HQ. In fact, is has happened that ideas 
developed from the HQ did not work at all in our subsidiary” 
B4: “People who work here have a good feeling for what works and what it is 
that customers like” 
Clit: ”You manage the projects by objectives and milestones.. You have reg-
ular quarterly reviews, after all, we are a small company so you can monitor 
things reasonably closely”. (McNamara, Baden-Fuller, and Howell 1999: 10). 
D3: “We have, and need to have financial objectives, which means you 
should really spend your time on billable hours with the client. But the natu-
ral context allows for time to do research, and you are not far away from 
your clients when you develop something because we listen to clients and 
involve them in research” 
Behavioral Com-
plexity 
 
(17x) 
Sproull 
and Hof-
meister 
(1986)  
 Role Behav-
ior 
 Flexibility 
 Commitment 
A5: “While people seem to have huge leeway in what they do, I have the 
feeling that there are serious constraints in how flexibly they can really act” 
B3” We need to be flexible here, we incorporate different roles, from event 
manager to conservative banker. We need to adjust to our clients because 
client satisfaction is key” 
B5 “every employee is not only banker but always something like a customer 
relationship manager, a PR specialist, in short someone who thinks out of 
the box. You need to sell not only banking service but also kitchen accesso-
ries and concert tickets and you need to live this!!” 
C1: ”It was quite amazing. Formerly, you were a specialist in your field.. you 
still continued to be one but the new task was to move out of the box and 
increase interdepartmental knowledge sharing” 
D1: “People travel from London to Spain to Portugal, all within one week. 
They communicate fluently in these languages and shift between cultures. Of 
course, you also have this in client relations. For some consultants, it is cer-
tainly less challenging to spend more time on office work” 
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Table A.2 continued: Implementation Categories, Subcategories, and Interview Examples 
Implementation 
Categories (num-
ber of mentions) 
Litera-
ture Re-
ferences  
Subcategories Illustrations 
Recruiting 
 
(16x) 
Pearce and 
Robinson 
(2005) 
 Personality 
 Education 
 Learning 
Skills 
A4: “It’s not a normal firm, they are all fanatics. Even our bankers are not 
normal bankers. You have to be a special type of person here and you need 
to like it. Perhaps, this is already a self-selection criterion in the recruitment 
process…” 
B4: “Criteria for recruiting are fairly simple: openness, a basic interest in the 
job, you use of body language. Probably, there is a self-selection process, 
people come here because they want to work here, later on they receive 
trainings and coaching.”  
Clit:”…simultaneously, 35 medical chemists were brought into the firm. 
This new blood not only provided key skills needed to implement the new 
strategy, but also a group of people who could stimulate and challenge” 
(Dodgson, 2001: 144) 
D4: “Individual objectives and career perspectives can change and then we 
discuss new options.. and there often is an option to change careers in the 
firm, like from managerial aspirations to technical expertise…so we are basi-
cally looking for open-minded people who can communicate well and who 
also have the personality to stand in front of the client” 
 
References 
Adner, Ron and Daniel A. Levinthal (2002): The Emergence of 
Emerging Technology, California Management Review, 45 (1): 
50-66. 
Adler, Paul, Barbara Godolftas, and David Levine (1999): 
Flexibility versus Efficiency? A Case Study of Model Change-
overs in the Toyota Production System, Strategic Management 
Journal, 24: 1011-1025. 
Akin, O. Zeynep and Patrick T. Harker (1999): To Sell or Not 
to Sell: Determining the Trade-offs Between Service and Sales 
in Retail Banking Phone Centers, Journal of Service Research, 2: 
19-33.  
Ambos, Bjoern and Bodo B. Schlegelmilch (2005): In Search of 
Global Advantage, European Business Forum, 21: 23-24. 
Astley, W. Graham and Raymond F. Zammuto (1992): Organi-
zation Science, Managers, and Language Games, Organization 
Science, 3: 443-460. 
Auh, Seigyoung and Bulent Menguc (2005): Balancing Ex-
ploration and Exploitation: The Moderating Role of Com-
petitive Intensity, Journal of Business Research, 58: 1652-1661. 
Bass, Bernard M. (1985): Leadership and Performance Beyond 
Expectation, Free Press: New York. 
Beckman, Christine M. (2006): The Influence of Founding 
Team Company Affiliations on Firm Behavior, Academy of Man-
agement Journal, 49: 741-758. 
Birkinshaw, Julian and Cristina Gibson (2004): Building Am-
bidexterity into an Organization, Sloan Management Review, 45 
(4): 47-55. 
Benner, Mary J. and Michael L. Tushman (2003): Exploita-
tion, Exploration, and Process Management: The Produc-
tivity Dilemma Revisited, Academy of Management Review, 28: 
238-256. 
Boeker, Warren (1997): Executive Migration and Strategic 
Change: The Effect of Top Manager Movement on Product-
Market Entry, Administrative Science Quarterly, 42: 213-236. 
Bonoma, Thomas V. (1984): Making Your Marketing Strat-
egy Work, Harvard Business Review, 62 (2): 69-76. 
Bonoma, Thomas V. and Victoria L. Crittendon (1988): 
Managing Marketing Implementation, Sloan Management 
Review, 29 (4): 7-14. 
Brown, John S. and Paul Dugoid (1991): Organizational 
Learning and Communities of Practice: Towards a Unified 
View of Working, Learning, and Innovation, Organization 
Science, 2: 40-57. 
Brown, Shona L. and Kathleen M. Eisenhardt, (1997): The Art 
of Continuous Change: Linking Complexity Theory and Time-
Paced Evolution in Relentlessly Shifting Organizations, Admin-
istrative Science Quarterly, 42: 1-34. 
Bubert, Renate, Johannes Gadner, and Lyn Richards (2004): 
Applying Qualitative Methods to Marketing Management Re-
search, Palgrave McMillan: Houndsmill et al. 
Burgelman, Richard A. (2002): Strategy as a Vector and the 
Inertia of Co-evolutionary Lock-in, Administrative Science Quar-
terly: 47: 325-358. 
Burns, James (1978): Leadership, Harper &Row: New York. 
Burns, Tom and George M. Stalker (1961): The Management of 
Innovation, Tavistock: London. 
Carlile, Paul R. (2004): Transferring, Translating and Trans-
forming: An Integrated Framework for Managing Knowledge 
Across Boundaries, Organization Science, 15: 555-568. 
Carmeli, Abraham and Meyrav Y. Halevi (2009): How Top 
Management Teams Behavioral Integration and Behavioral 
Complexity enable Organizational Ambidexterity. The Moder-
ating Role of Contextual Ambidexteritxy, The Leadership Quar-
terly, 20: 207-218. 
Carson, Stephen (2007): When to Give Up Control of Out-
sourced New Product Development, Journal of Marketing, 71 (1): 
49-66. 
Chimhanzi, Jaqueline and Robert E. Morgan (2005): Explana-
tions from the Marketing/Human Resource Dyad for Market-
BuR - Business Research 
Official Open Access Journal of VHB 
Verband der Hochschullehrer für Betriebswirtschaft e.V. 
Volume 2 | Issue 2 | December 2009 | 215-240 
238 
ing Strategy Implementation Effectiveness in Service Firms, 
Journal of Business Research, 58: 87-796. 
Cespedes, Frank (1991): Organizing and Implementing the Market-
ing Effort, Addison-Wesley: Reading, Mass. 
Christensen, Clayton M. and Michael Raynor (2003): The Inno-
vator's Solution, Harvard Business School Press: Boston. 
Churchill, Gilbert A. and Dawn Iacobcci (2005): Marketing 
Research: Methodological Foundations, 9th Edition, Thompson 
South-Western: Mason, Ohio. 
Danneels, Erwin (2002): The Dynamics of Product Innova-
tion and Firm Competencies, Strategic Management Journal, 
23: 1095-116. 
Day, George S. (1994): The Capabilities of Market-Driven 
Organizations, Journal of Marketing, 58 (2): 37-52. 
Day, George S. (1989): Deciding How to Compete, Planning 
Review, 17 (5): 18-23. 
Deming, W.E. (1981): Management of Statistical Techniques for 
Quality and Productivity, New York University Graduate School 
of Business: New York. 
Dobni, C. Brooke (2006): Developing an Innovation Orienta-
tion in Financial Services Organizations, Journal of Financial 
Services Marketing, 11: 166-179. 
Dodgson, Mark (1991): Technology Learning, Technology 
Strategy and Competitive Pressures, British Journal of Man-
agement, 2: 133-149. 
Drazin, Robert and Peter Howard (1984): Strategy Implemen-
tation: A Technique for Organizational Design, Columbia Jour-
nal of World Business, 19: 40-46. 
Druckman, Daniel and Terrance Hopmann (2002): Content 
Analysis, in: Kremenyuk, V.A. (ed.), International Negotiation: 
Analysis, Approaches, Issues, Jossey-Bass: San Francisco, 288-
314. 
Duncan, Robert B. (1976): The Ambidextrous Organization: 
Designing Dual Structures for Innovation, in: Pondy, Lois R. 
and Dennis P. Slevin (eds.): The Management of Organization 
Design: Volume, Strategies and Implementation, Elsevier: New 
York,  167-188. 
Evans, Kenneth R., Todd J. Arnold, and John A. Grant (1999), 
Combining Service and Sales at the Point of Customer Contact: 
A Retail Banking Example, Journal of Service Research, 2 (1): 34-
49. 
Fang, Eric and Shaoming Zou (2009): Antecedents and Conse-
quences of Marketing Dynamic Capabilities in International 
Joint Ventures, Journal of International Business Studies, 40: 742-
761. 
Fiedler, Fred (1967): A Theory of Leadership Effectiveness, 
McGraw-Hill: New York. 
Floyd, Steven and Peter W. Lane (2000): Strategizing through-
out the Organization: Managing Role Conflict in Strategic Re-
newal, Academy of Management Review, 25: 154-177. 
Forman, Janis and Paul A. Argenti (2005), How Corporate 
Communication Influences Strategy Implementation, Reputa-
tion and the Corporate Brand: An Exploratory Qualitative 
Study, Corporate Reputation Review, 8: 245-264. 
Franckwick, Gary, James C. Ward, Michael D. Hutt, and Peter 
Reingen (1994): Evolving  Patterns  of  Organizational  Belief in 
the Formation of Strategy, Journal of Marketing, 58 (2): 96-110. 
Gale, Bradley (1992): Monitoring Customer Satisfaction and 
Market-perceived Quality, American Marketing Association Worth 
Repeating Series, Number 022CSO1.  
Gersick, Connie (1991): Revolutionary Change Theories: A 
Multilevel Exploration of the Punctuated Equilibrium 
Paradigm, Academy of Management Review, 16: 10-36. 
Ghoshal Sumantra and Christopher A. Bartlett (1994): Linking 
Organizational Context and Managerial Action: The Dimen-
sions of Quality of Management, Strategic Management Journal, 
15: 91-112. 
Gibson, Cristina and Julian Birkinshaw (2004): The Antece-
dents, Consequences, and Mediating Role of Organizational 
Ambidexterity, Academy of Management Journal, 47: 209-226. 
Govindarajan, Vijay. (1988): A Contingency Approach to Strat-
egy Implementation at the Business Unit Level: Integrating 
Administrative Mechanisms with Strategy, Academy of Man-
agement Journal, 27: 25-41. 
Greve, Heinrich R. (2007): Exploration and Exploitation in 
Product Innovation, Industrial and Corporate Change, 16: 945-
975. 
Griffin, Abbie and John H. Hauser (1996): Integrating R&D 
and Marketing: A Review and Analysis of the Literature, Jour-
nal of Product Innovation Management, 13: 191-215. 
Güttel, Wolfgang H. and Stefan W. Konlechner (2009): Con-
tinuously Hanging by a Thread: Managing Contextually Ambi-
dextrous Organizations, Schmalenbach Business Review, 61: 149-
171. 
Gupta, Anil K., Ken G. Smith, and Christina E. Shalley (2006): 
The Interplay Between Exploration and Exploitation, Academy 
of Management Journal, 49: 693-706. 
Han, Mary (2007): Achieving Superior Internationalization 
Through Strategic Ambidexterity, Journal of Enterprising Culture, 
15: 43-77. 
Hart, Stuart and Catherine Banbury (1994): How Strategy-
Making Processes Can Make a Difference, Strategic Management 
Journal, 15: 251-268. 
He Zi-Lin and Poh-Kam Wong (2004): Exploration versus Ex-
ploitation: An Empirical Test of the Ambidexterity Hypothesis, 
Organization Science, 15: 481-494. 
Jansen, Justin J. P., Frans A. J. Van den Bosch, and Henk 
W. Volberda (2005): Exploratory Innovation, Exploitative 
Innovation, and Ambidexterity: The Impact of Environ-
mental and Organizational Antecedents, Schmalenbach Busi-
ness Review, 57: 351-363. 
Jansen, Justin J. P., Michiel P. Tempelaar, Frans A. J. Van 
den Bosch, and Henk W. Volberda (2009): Structural Dif-
ferentiation and Ambidexterity: The Mediating Role of In-
tegration Mechanisms, Organization Science, 20: 797-811. 
Jaworski, Bernard and Deborah J. McInnis (1989): Marketing 
Jobs and Management Control: Towards a Framework, Journal 
of Marketing Research, 26: 406-19. 
Jaworski, Bernard., Ajay K. Kohli, and Arvind Sahay (2000): 
Market-driven versus driving-markets, Journal of the Academy of 
Marketing Science, 28: 45-54. 
BuR - Business Research 
Official Open Access Journal of VHB 
Verband der Hochschullehrer für Betriebswirtschaft e.V. 
Volume 2 | Issue 2 | December 2009 | 215-240 
239 
Jick, Todd D. (1979): Mixing Qualitative and Quantitative 
Methods, Triangulation in Action, Administrative Science Quar-
terly, 24: 602-611.  
Juran Joseph M. and Frank M. Gryna (1988): Juran’s Quality 
Control Handbook, McGraw Hill, Inc.: New York. 
Katila Riita and Gautam Ahuja (2000): Something Old, Some-
thing New: A Longitudinal Study of Search Behavior and New 
Product Introductions, Academy of Management Journal, 45: 
1183-1194. 
Klein, Katherine J., Fred Dansereau, and Rosalie I. Hall (1994): 
Levels Issues in Theory Development, Data Collection, and 
Analysis, Academy of Management Review, 19: 195-229. 
Kraatz Matthew S. and James H. Moore (2002): Executive Mi-
gration and Institutional Change, Academy of Management Jour-
nal, 45: 120-143. 
Kumar, Nirmalya (1997): The Revolution in Retailing: from 
Market Driven to Market Driving, Long Range Planning, 30: 
830-836. 
Kyriakopoulos, Kyriakos and Christine Moorman, C. (2004): 
Tradeoffs in Marketing Exploitation and Exploration Strate-
gies: The Overlooked Role of Market Orientation, International 
Journal of Research in Marketing, 21: 219-240. 
Lavie Dovev and Lori Rosenkopf (2006): Balancing Explora-
tion and Exploitation in Alliance Formation, Academy of Man-
agement Journal, 49: 791-818. 
Lee, Jeho and Young U. Ryu (2002): Exploration, Exploitation, 
and Adaptive Rationality: The Neo-Schumperian Perspective, 
Simulation Modeling Practice and Theory, 10 (5-7): 297-320. 
Leonard-Barton, Dorothy (1992): Core Capabilities and Core 
Rigidities: A Paradox in Managing New Product Development, 
Strategic Management Journal, 13 (S1): 111-125.  
Lewis, Marianne W. (2000): Exploring Paradox: Toward a 
More Comprehensive Guide, Academy of Management Review, 
25: 760-776. 
Levinthal Daniel A. and James G. March (1993): The Myopia of 
Learning, Strategic Management Journal, 14: 95-112. 
Li , Yang, Sun Guohui, and Martin J. Eppler (2008): Making 
Strategy Work: A Literature Review on the Factors Influencing Strat-
egy Implementation, ICA Lugano, Working Paper 2/2008: 1-46. 
Lubatkin, Michael H., Zeki Simek, Yan Lin, and John F. 
Veiga (2006): Ambidexterity and Performance in Small-to 
Medium- Sized Firms: The Pivotal Role of Top Manage-
ment Team Behavioral Integration, Journal of Management, 
32: 646-672. 
March, James G. (1991): Exploration and Exploitation in 
Organizational Learning, Organization Science, 2: 71-87.  
Mayr, Ernst (1942): Systematics and the Origin of Species, Co-
lumbia University Press: New York.  
McDonough Edward F. and Richard Leifer (1983): Using 
Simultaneous Structures to Cope with Uncertainty, Academy 
of Management Journal, 26: 727-735. 
McEwen, William (2008): The Chief Marketing Officer’s 
Dilemma, Gallup Management Journal, March 13, 2008, 
http://gmj.gallup.com/content/104704/Chief-Marketing-
Officers-Dilemma.aspx (Access Date: 5 April, 2009) 
McGrath, Rita G. (2001): Exploratory Learning, Innovative 
Capacity and Managerial Oversight, Academy of Manage-
ment Journal, 44: 118-131. 
McNamara, Peter and Charles Baden-Fuller, C. (1999): Les-
sons from the Celltech Case: Balancing Knowledge Explora-
tion and Exploitation in Organizational Renewal, British 
Journal of Management, 10: 291-307. 
McNamara, Peter, Charles Baden-Fuller, and James Howell 
(1999): The Rejuvenation of Celltech in the1990s: Laying the 
Foundations of a FTSE 100 Company, ECCH Case Study No. 
300-072-1. 
Menguc, Bulent and Seigyoung Auh (2008): The Asymmet-
ric Moderating Role of Market Orientation on the Ambidex-
terity – Firm Performance Relationship for Prospectors and 
Defenders, Industrial Marketing Management, 37: 455-470. 
Miles, Matthew, B. and A. Michael Huberman (1984), Quali-
tative Data Analysis, 2nd ed., Sage Publications: London.  
Miller, Danny and Peter H. Friesen (1984): Organizations: A 
Quantum View, Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, NJ. 
Miller, Danny and Peter H. Friesen (1986): Porter’s Generic 
Strategies and Performance, Organization Studies, 7: 37-56. 
Mom, Tom J.M. (2007): Managers’ Exploration and Exploitation 
Activities: The Influence of Organizational Factors and Knowledge 
Inflows, Dissertation, Erasmus University Rotterdam. 
Morris, Betsy (2008): What Makes Apple Golden, Fortune, 
March 17, 2008, 157 (5): 68-71. 
Nemanich, Loise A. and Vera Duysa (2009): Transforma-
tional Leadership and Ambidexterity in the Context of an 
Acquisition, The Leadership Quarterly, 20: 19-33. 
Noble, Charles H. (1999): Building the Strategy Implemen-
tation Network, Business Horizons, 42 (6): 19-28. 
Noble, Charles H. and Michael P. Mokwa (1999): Imple-
menting Marketing Strategies: Developing and Testing a 
Managerial Strategy, Journal of Marketing, 63 (4): 57-73. 
O’Reilly Charles A. and Michael L. Tushman (2004): The 
Ambidextrous Organization, Harvard Business Review, 82 (4): 
74-81. 
O’Reilly Charles A. and Michael L. Tushman (2007): Ambi-
dexterity as a Dynamic Capability: Resolving the Innova-
tor’s Dilemma, Research Paper No. 1963, Stanford Gradu-
ate School of Business. 
Osborn, Richard N., James G. Hunt, and Lawrence R. Jauch 
(2002): Toward a contextual theory of leadership, The Leader-
ship Quarterly, 13: 707-837.  
Peirce, John and Richard Robinson (2005): Formulation, Im-
plementation, and Control of Competitive Strategy, New York: 
McGraw Hill: 
Porter, Michael E. (1980): Competitive Strategy, The Free Press: 
New York. 
Porter, Michal E. (1996): What is Strategy?, Harvard Business 
Review, 74 (6): 61-78.  
Puranam, Pranish, Harbir Singh, and Maurizio Zollo 
(2006): Organizing for Innovation: Managing the Coordi-
nation-Autonomy Dilemma in Technology Acquisitions, 
Academy of Management Journal, 49: 263-280.  
BuR - Business Research 
Official Open Access Journal of VHB 
Verband der Hochschullehrer für Betriebswirtschaft e.V. 
Volume 2 | Issue 2 | December 2009 | 215-240 
240 
Quelch, John A. (2005): Ambidextrous Marketing, The Wall 
Street Journal, October 11, B2. 
Raisch, Sebastian (2008): Balanced Structures: Designing Or-
ganizations for Profitable Growth, Long Range Planning, 41: 
483-508. 
Raisch, Sebastian and Julian Birkinshaw (2008): Organiza-
tional Ambidexterity: Antecedents, Outcomes, and Moderators, 
Journal of Management, 34: 375-409. 
Rapert, Molly I., Anne Velliquette, and Judith A. Garretson 
(2002): The Strategic Implementation Process Evoking Strate-
gic Consensus through Communication, Journal of Business Re-
search, 55: 301-310. 
Roethaermel Frank T. and David L. Deeds (2004): Exploration 
and Exploitation Alliances in Biotechnology: A System of New 
Product Development, Strategic Management Journal, 25: 201-
221.  
Shashittal, Hemant C. and David Whilemon (1996): Marketing 
Implementation in Small and Midsized Industrial Firms, Indus-
trial Marketing Management, 25: 67-78. 
Schneider, Benjamin and David E. Bowen (1995): Winning the 
Service Game, Harvard University Press: Boston. 
Sculley John and David Byrne (1987): Odyssey: Pepsi to Apple, A 
Journey of Adventure. Ideas and the Future, Harper Collins: New 
York, 147. 
Siggelkow Nicolai and Daniel A. Levinthal (2003): Temporarily 
Divide to Conquer: Centralized, Decentralized, and Reinte-
grated Organizational Approaches to Exploration and Adapta-
tion, Organization Science, 14: 650-669. 
Simek, Zeki (2009): Organizational Ambidexterity: Towards a 
Multilevel Understanding, Journal of Management Studies, 46: 
597-624. 
Sirmon, David G., Michael Hitt, and R. Duane Ireland (2007): 
Managing firm-resources in dynamic environments to create 
value: Looking inside the black box, Academy of Management 
Review, 32: 273-292. 
Smith, Wendy and Michael L. Tushman (2005): Managing 
Strategic Contradictions: A Top Management Model for Man-
aging Innovation Streams, Organization Science, 16: 522-536.   
Souder, William E. and Alok C. Chakrabarti, (1978): The 
R&D/Marketing Interface: Results from an Empirical Study on 
Innovation Projects, IEEE Transaction on Engineering, 25 (4): 
88-93. 
Sproull, Lee S. and Kay R. Hofmeister (1986): Thinking about 
Implementation, Journal of Management, 12: 43-60. 
Srnka, Katharina J. and Sabine T. Koeszegi (2007): From 
Words to Numbers: How to Transform Qualitative Data into 
Meaningful Quantitative Results, Schmalenbach Business Review, 
59: 29-57. 
Teece, David, Gary Pisano, and Amy Shuen (1997): Dynamic 
Capabilities and Strategic Management, Strategic Management 
Journal, 18: 509-533. 
Thompson James D. (1967): Organizations in Action: Social Sci-
ences Bases of Administrative Theory, McGraw Hill: New York. 
Tsai, Wenpin (2002): Social structure of ‘coopetition’ within a 
multiunit organization: Coordination, competition, and intra-
organizational knowledge sharing, Organization Science, 13: 179-
190. 
Tushman, Michael L. and Elaine Romanelli (1994): Organiza-
tional Transformation as Punctuated Equilibrium: An Empiri-
cal Test, Academy of Management Journal, 37: 1141-1166. 
Tushman Michael L. and Charles A. O'Reilly (1996): Ambidex-
trous Organizations: Managing Evolutionary and Revolution-
ary Change, California Management Review, 38 (4): 8-30. 
Tushman Michael L. and Charles A. O'Reilly (1997): Winning 
Through Innovation: A Practical Guide to Leading Organizational 
Change and Renewal, Harvard University Press: Boston. 
Virany, Beverly, Michael Tushman, and Elaine Romanelli 
(1992): Executive Succession and Organizational Outcomes in 
Turbulent Environments: An Organizational Learning Ap-
proach, Organization Science, 3: 72-92. 
Volberda, Henk W. (1998): Building the Flexible Firm, Oxford 
University Press: Oxford. 
Walker, Orville C. and Robert Rueckert (1987): Marketing’s 
Role in the Implementation of Business Strategy: A Critical 
Review and Conceptual Framework, Journal of Marketing, 51 
(3): 15-33. 
Walker, Orville C., Gilbert A. Churchill, and Neil M. Ford 
(1977): Motivation and Performance in Industrial Selling: Pre-
sent Knowledge and Needed Research, Journal of Marketing Re-
search, 14: 156-168. 
Webb, James (1992): Understanding and Designing Marketing 
Research, Academic Press: London. 
Westley, Frances (1990): Middle Managers and Strategy: Mi-
cro-dynamics and Inclusion, Strategic Management Journal, 11: 
337-51. 
White, J. Chris, Jeffrey S. Conant, and Raj Echambadi (2003): 
Marketing Strategy Development Styles, Implementation Ca-
pability, and Firm Performance: Investigating the Curvilinear 
Impact on Multiple Strategy-Making Styles, Marketing Letters, 
14: 111-124.  
Woolridge, Bill and Steven W. Floyd (1989): Research Notes 
and Communications: Strategic Process Effects on Consensus, 
Strategic Management Journal, 10: 295-302. 
Biographies 
Christiane Prange, Dipl.-Kffr., Ph.D., is an Associate Profes-
sor of International Marketing and Strategy at EM Lyon Busi-
ness School in France. After several years in industry and man-
agement consulting she returned to academia and obtained her 
Ph.D. from Geneva University. Switzerland. She held both 
teaching and research positions with the Open University and 
the University of Liverpool in the UK, the Vienna University of 
Economics and Business Administration in Austria as well as 
visiting assignments in several Asian and European countries. 
Bodo B. Schlegelmilch, M.Sc., Ph.D., D.Litt., is Dean of the 
WU Executive Academy and Professor of International Market-
ing and Management at the Vienna University of Economics 
and Business Administration (WU) and at Leeds University 
Business School. He is also a Fellow of the Chartered Institute 
of Marketing and Adjunct Professor of International Business 
Studies at the University of Minnesota, Carlson School of Man-
agement and at Kingston University, London, UK. 
